What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction”?

Answer: Chapter 7 examines tax-farm bidding in the Song shi with Su Zhe's proposal to fix a middle price and ban outbidding (in an illustrative model, bidding one's own estimate gives a chance of default of 0.9691), and the Babylonian marriage auction recorded by Herodotus (receipts 3.373 times the dowries).

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.9691

Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = 280; minus 150 leaves 130 (wan guan)
rulemean paymean VP(default)overpay
sealed own estimate899.7800.00.9691103.7
open outbidding849.6800.00.809069.2
shaded for the curse799.7800.00.591828.3
fixed 2/3 price566.4800.00.00000.0
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p71: Song-dynasty tax-farm bidding as a common-value lot.
# Su Zhe's figures (Song shi, juan 177, in wan guan, i.e. 10,000 guan):
# a year of farm revenue about 420; fixing a middle price and banning
# outbidding, "cut by one third", still leaves about 280; the costs it
# had to cover about 150. Checked with exact fractions below.
# Model (illustrative, not a reconstruction): a farm's true yearly
# take V ~ U[600, 1000] guan, the same for all; n = 5 bidders each see
# a signal x = V + e, e ~ U[-150, 150]. Rules compared over 20,000
# seeded lots: sealed bid of one's own estimate (pay top signal); open
# outbidding (pay second signal); bids shaded for the winner's curse,
# x - 150 (n - 1)/(n + 1); a fixed middle price of 2/3 of the
# outbid price. "Default" = the farmer owes more than V.
import math
import random
from fractions import Fraction as Fr

total, kept, cost = Fr(420), Fr(420) * (1 - Fr(1, 3)), Fr(150)
print("Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = %s; minus 150 leaves %s (wan guan)"
      % (kept, kept - cost))
N, E, RUNS = 5, 150.0, 20000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
rows = {"sealed own estimate": [], "open outbidding": [],
        "shaded for the curse": [], "fixed 2/3 price": []}
for _ in range(RUNS):
    v = rng.uniform(600.0, 1000.0)
    x = sorted((v + rng.uniform(-E, E) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
    shade = E * (N - 1) / (N + 1)
    for name, pay in (("sealed own estimate", x[0]),
                      ("open outbidding", x[1]),
                      ("shaded for the curse", x[0] - shade),
                      ("fixed 2/3 price", x[1] * 2.0 / 3.0)):
        rows[name].append((pay, v))
print("rule                   mean pay  mean V   P(default)  overpay")
for name in ("sealed own estimate", "open outbidding",
             "shaded for the curse", "fixed 2/3 price"):
    r = rows[name]
    pay = math.fsum(p for p, _ in r) / RUNS
    val = math.fsum(v for _, v in r) / RUNS
    bad = [p - v for p, v in r if p > v]
    print("%-21s  %7.1f   %6.1f   %.4f      %5.1f"
          % (name, pay, val, len(bad) / RUNS,
             math.fsum(bad) / len(bad) if bad else 0.0))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book