What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction”?
Answer: Chapter 7 examines tax-farm bidding in the Song shi with Su Zhe's proposal to fix a middle price and ban outbidding (in an illustrative model, bidding one's own estimate gives a chance of default of 0.9691), and the Babylonian marriage auction recorded by Herodotus (receipts 3.373 times the dowries).
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.9691
| Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = 280; minus 150 leaves 130 (wan guan) | ||||
| rule | mean pay | mean V | P(default) | overpay |
| sealed own estimate | 899.7 | 800.0 | 0.9691 | 103.7 |
| open outbidding | 849.6 | 800.0 | 0.8090 | 69.2 |
| shaded for the curse | 799.7 | 800.0 | 0.5918 | 28.3 |
| fixed 2/3 price | 566.4 | 800.0 | 0.0000 | 0.0 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p71: Song-dynasty tax-farm bidding as a common-value lot.
# Su Zhe's figures (Song shi, juan 177, in wan guan, i.e. 10,000 guan):
# a year of farm revenue about 420; fixing a middle price and banning
# outbidding, "cut by one third", still leaves about 280; the costs it
# had to cover about 150. Checked with exact fractions below.
# Model (illustrative, not a reconstruction): a farm's true yearly
# take V ~ U[600, 1000] guan, the same for all; n = 5 bidders each see
# a signal x = V + e, e ~ U[-150, 150]. Rules compared over 20,000
# seeded lots: sealed bid of one's own estimate (pay top signal); open
# outbidding (pay second signal); bids shaded for the winner's curse,
# x - 150 (n - 1)/(n + 1); a fixed middle price of 2/3 of the
# outbid price. "Default" = the farmer owes more than V.
import math
import random
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
total, kept, cost = Fr(420), Fr(420) * (1 - Fr(1, 3)), Fr(150)
print("Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = %s; minus 150 leaves %s (wan guan)"
% (kept, kept - cost))
N, E, RUNS = 5, 150.0, 20000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
rows = {"sealed own estimate": [], "open outbidding": [],
"shaded for the curse": [], "fixed 2/3 price": []}
for _ in range(RUNS):
v = rng.uniform(600.0, 1000.0)
x = sorted((v + rng.uniform(-E, E) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
shade = E * (N - 1) / (N + 1)
for name, pay in (("sealed own estimate", x[0]),
("open outbidding", x[1]),
("shaded for the curse", x[0] - shade),
("fixed 2/3 price", x[1] * 2.0 / 3.0)):
rows[name].append((pay, v))
print("rule mean pay mean V P(default) overpay")
for name in ("sealed own estimate", "open outbidding",
"shaded for the curse", "fixed 2/3 price"):
r = rows[name]
pay = math.fsum(p for p, _ in r) / RUNS
val = math.fsum(v for _, v in r) / RUNS
bad = [p - v for p, v in r if p > v]
print("%-21s %7.1f %6.1f %.4f %5.1f"
% (name, pay, val, len(bad) / RUNS,
math.fsum(bad) / len(bad) if bad else 0.0))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test