What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution”?

Answer: Chapter 3 draws up the bill for a reserve: with three buyers the chance of no sale rises to 0.2441, and buyers give up 1.868 yuan for every 1 yuan the owner gains.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.2441, 1.868

nP(no sale) r=sP(no sale) r*seller gainlost surplusbuyers lose
10.25000.625011250562516875
20.06250.39068438562514062
30.01560.2441501043519360
40.00390.1526278630675854
50.00100.0954152420703594
60.00020.059683513632199
80.00000.0233258569827
n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers 1.868 yuan
n = 3: gain 320625/64 yuan, lost surplus 556875/128 yuan (exact)
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: what the optimal reserve costs, and who pays for it.
# Bag values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, seller value s = 100,000
# (illustrative: what the house can realise by keeping the bag).
# Compare reserve r = s (efficient: sells whenever some v >= s) with
# r* = 130,000. With x = (v - 80,000) / 80,000, the top value has CDF
# x^n; everything below is exact (fractions), in yuan.
#   no-sale probability        = t^n,  t = (r - L) / W
#   lost surplus (efficiency)  = E[(v_max - s) 1{s <= v_max < r*}]
#   buyers' loss               = seller gain + lost surplus
from fractions import Fraction as Fr

L, W, S, R = 80000, 80000, 100000, 130000
a, b = Fr(S - L, W), Fr(R - L, W)


def payoff(n, t):
    rev0 = Fr(n - 1, n + 1) + t ** n - Fr(2 * n, n + 1) * t ** (n + 1)
    return L * (1 - t ** n) + W * rev0 + S * t ** n


def lost(n):
    return ((L - S) * (b ** n - a ** n)
            + W * Fr(n, n + 1) * (b ** (n + 1) - a ** (n + 1)))


print("n  P(no sale) r=s  P(no sale) r*  seller gain  lost surplus"
      "  buyers lose")
for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8):
    g = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a)
    ls = lost(n)
    print("%d  %.4f          %.4f         %8.0f     %8.0f      %8.0f"
          % (n, float(a ** n), float(b ** n), float(g), float(ls),
             float(g + ls)))
n = 3
g, ls = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a), lost(n)
print("n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers %.3f yuan"
      % float((g + ls) / g))
print("n = 3: gain %s yuan, lost surplus %s yuan (exact)" % (g, ls))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book