What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution”?
Answer: Chapter 3 draws up the bill for a reserve: with three buyers the chance of no sale rises to 0.2441, and buyers give up 1.868 yuan for every 1 yuan the owner gains.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.2441, 1.868
| n | P(no sale) r=s | P(no sale) r* | seller gain | lost surplus | buyers lose |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.2500 | 0.6250 | 11250 | 5625 | 16875 |
| 2 | 0.0625 | 0.3906 | 8438 | 5625 | 14062 |
| 3 | 0.0156 | 0.2441 | 5010 | 4351 | 9360 |
| 4 | 0.0039 | 0.1526 | 2786 | 3067 | 5854 |
| 5 | 0.0010 | 0.0954 | 1524 | 2070 | 3594 |
| 6 | 0.0002 | 0.0596 | 835 | 1363 | 2199 |
| 8 | 0.0000 | 0.0233 | 258 | 569 | 827 |
| n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers 1.868 yuan | |||||
| n = 3: gain 320625/64 yuan, lost surplus 556875/128 yuan (exact) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: what the optimal reserve costs, and who pays for it.
# Bag values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, seller value s = 100,000
# (illustrative: what the house can realise by keeping the bag).
# Compare reserve r = s (efficient: sells whenever some v >= s) with
# r* = 130,000. With x = (v - 80,000) / 80,000, the top value has CDF
# x^n; everything below is exact (fractions), in yuan.
# no-sale probability = t^n, t = (r - L) / W
# lost surplus (efficiency) = E[(v_max - s) 1{s <= v_max < r*}]
# buyers' loss = seller gain + lost surplus
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
L, W, S, R = 80000, 80000, 100000, 130000
a, b = Fr(S - L, W), Fr(R - L, W)
def payoff(n, t):
rev0 = Fr(n - 1, n + 1) + t ** n - Fr(2 * n, n + 1) * t ** (n + 1)
return L * (1 - t ** n) + W * rev0 + S * t ** n
def lost(n):
return ((L - S) * (b ** n - a ** n)
+ W * Fr(n, n + 1) * (b ** (n + 1) - a ** (n + 1)))
print("n P(no sale) r=s P(no sale) r* seller gain lost surplus"
" buyers lose")
for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8):
g = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a)
ls = lost(n)
print("%d %.4f %.4f %8.0f %8.0f %8.0f"
% (n, float(a ** n), float(b ** n), float(g), float(ls),
float(g + ls)))
n = 3
g, ls = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a), lost(n)
print("n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers %.3f yuan"
% float((g + ls) / g))
print("n = 3: gain %s yuan, lost surplus %s yuan (exact)" % (g, ls))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test