What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test”?

Answer: Chapter 8 gives a six-step sealed-bid procedure, a public notice for second-price seats, the Sealed-Bid Reserve Price Calculator and a pre-registered test plan: with three buyers the no-sale test needs 33 pieces per group and the revenue test 164. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 164, 33

n arm mean sd lots per arm for this gap
2 floor111240 14539
2 r*119534 16334
gap 8294, pooled sd 1546355 lots per arm
3 floor121139 16304
3 r*126143 16029
gap 5004, pooled sd 16167164 lots per arm
5 floor133388 14142
5 r*135021 13893
gap 1632, pooled sd 140181158 lots per arm
no-sale rate n3: 0.0156 vs 0.2441 -> 33 lots per arm
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p82: how many lots a pre-registered reserve test needs.
# Design: each eligible lot is randomly assigned to "floor = s" or
# "reserve = r*" before invitations go out; outcome = seller payoff of
# the lot (price if sold, s if kept). Per-lot spread is estimated by a
# seeded Monte Carlo of the book's uniform model (values U[80,000,
# 160,000] yuan, s = 100,000, r* = 130,000), 40,000 lots per arm.
# Two-sided a = 0.05, power 0.80, unpaired:
#   lots per arm = 2 (z_a + z_b)^2 sd^2 / delta^2.
# All parameters are illustrative; a house must use its own estimates.
import math
import random
from statistics import NormalDist

L, H, S, R, RUNS = 80000.0, 160000.0, 100000.0, 130000.0, 40000
Z = NormalDist()
za, zb = Z.inv_cdf(0.975), Z.inv_cdf(0.80)
rng = random.Random(20261113)


def lot(vals, r):
    v = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
    if v[0] < r:
        return S
    return max(v[1], r) if len(v) > 1 else r


print("n  arm      mean     sd      lots per arm for this gap")
plan = {}
for n in (2, 3, 5):
    res = {}
    for name, r in (("floor", S), ("r*", R)):
        x = [lot([rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(n)], r)
             for _ in range(RUNS)]
        m = math.fsum(x) / RUNS
        sd = math.sqrt(math.fsum((y - m) ** 2 for y in x) / (RUNS - 1))
        res[name] = (m, sd)
    delta = res["r*"][0] - res["floor"][0]
    sd = math.sqrt((res["r*"][1] ** 2 + res["floor"][1] ** 2) / 2.0)
    need = math.ceil(2.0 * (za + zb) ** 2 * sd ** 2 / delta ** 2)
    plan[n] = need
    for name in ("floor", "r*"):
        print("%d  %-5s  %8.0f  %6.0f" % (n, name, res[name][0],
                                         res[name][1]))
    print("   gap %.0f, pooled sd %.0f -> %d lots per arm"
          % (delta, sd, need))
p0, p1 = 0.25 ** 3, 0.625 ** 3
pbar = (p0 + p1) / 2.0
k = math.ceil((za * math.sqrt(2 * pbar * (1 - pbar))
               + zb * math.sqrt(p0 * (1 - p0) + p1 * (1 - p1))) ** 2
              / (p1 - p0) ** 2)
print("no-sale rate n = 3: %.4f vs %.4f -> %d lots per arm" % (p0, p1, k))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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