What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives a six-step sealed-bid procedure, a public notice for second-price seats, the Sealed-Bid Reserve Price Calculator and a pre-registered test plan: with three buyers the no-sale test needs 33 pieces per group and the revenue test 164. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 164, 33
| n arm mean sd lots per arm for this gap | |
| 2 floor | 111240 14539 |
| 2 r* | 119534 16334 |
| gap 8294, pooled sd 15463 | 55 lots per arm |
| 3 floor | 121139 16304 |
| 3 r* | 126143 16029 |
| gap 5004, pooled sd 16167 | 164 lots per arm |
| 5 floor | 133388 14142 |
| 5 r* | 135021 13893 |
| gap 1632, pooled sd 14018 | 1158 lots per arm |
| no-sale rate n | 3: 0.0156 vs 0.2441 -> 33 lots per arm |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p82: how many lots a pre-registered reserve test needs.
# Design: each eligible lot is randomly assigned to "floor = s" or
# "reserve = r*" before invitations go out; outcome = seller payoff of
# the lot (price if sold, s if kept). Per-lot spread is estimated by a
# seeded Monte Carlo of the book's uniform model (values U[80,000,
# 160,000] yuan, s = 100,000, r* = 130,000), 40,000 lots per arm.
# Two-sided a = 0.05, power 0.80, unpaired:
# lots per arm = 2 (z_a + z_b)^2 sd^2 / delta^2.
# All parameters are illustrative; a house must use its own estimates.
import math
import random
from statistics import NormalDist
L, H, S, R, RUNS = 80000.0, 160000.0, 100000.0, 130000.0, 40000
Z = NormalDist()
za, zb = Z.inv_cdf(0.975), Z.inv_cdf(0.80)
rng = random.Random(20261113)
def lot(vals, r):
v = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
if v[0] < r:
return S
return max(v[1], r) if len(v) > 1 else r
print("n arm mean sd lots per arm for this gap")
plan = {}
for n in (2, 3, 5):
res = {}
for name, r in (("floor", S), ("r*", R)):
x = [lot([rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(n)], r)
for _ in range(RUNS)]
m = math.fsum(x) / RUNS
sd = math.sqrt(math.fsum((y - m) ** 2 for y in x) / (RUNS - 1))
res[name] = (m, sd)
delta = res["r*"][0] - res["floor"][0]
sd = math.sqrt((res["r*"][1] ** 2 + res["floor"][1] ** 2) / 2.0)
need = math.ceil(2.0 * (za + zb) ** 2 * sd ** 2 / delta ** 2)
plan[n] = need
for name in ("floor", "r*"):
print("%d %-5s %8.0f %6.0f" % (n, name, res[name][0],
res[name][1]))
print(" gap %.0f, pooled sd %.0f -> %d lots per arm"
% (delta, sd, need))
p0, p1 = 0.25 ** 3, 0.625 ** 3
pbar = (p0 + p1) / 2.0
k = math.ceil((za * math.sqrt(2 * pbar * (1 - pbar))
+ zb * math.sqrt(p0 * (1 - p0) + p1 * (1 - p1))) ** 2
/ (p1 - p0) ** 2)
print("no-sale rate n = 3: %.4f vs %.4f -> %d lots per arm" % (p0, p1, k))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction