What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal”?
Answer: Chapter 4 covers truth-telling, overbidding and shill bids (a hidden shill takes 16,000 yuan from each winner) and locks bids and reserve with SHA-256 commitment and reveal.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 16000
| A. overbidding factor, mean price, P(regret), mean regret | |
| d | 0.00 price 127926 P(regret) 0.0000 regret 0 |
| d | 0.05 price 134322 P(regret) 0.3018 regret 3698 |
| d | 0.10 price 140719 P(regret) 0.5110 regret 7735 |
| d | 0.15 price 147115 P(regret) 0.6600 regret 12035 |
| B. honest second-price mean 128000, with a hidden shill 144000 | |
| transfer from the winning client per sale | 16000 yuan |
| winner's expected surplus: honest 16000, shill 0 | |
| if shills are expected: bids fall to first-price, mean 128000 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p42: two ways a second-price sealed bid goes wrong.
# n = 4 bidders, values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan (illustrative).
# A. Bidders overbid by a factor (1 + d), as laboratory subjects often
# do in second-price auctions; seeded Monte Carlo, 20,000 auctions.
# A winner "regrets" when the price paid exceeds own value.
# B. A dishonest house reads the sealed bids and inserts a fake bid
# just under the top one (shill bid): the price becomes the top bid.
# Exact: honest E[v_(2)] = L + W (n-1)/(n+1); shill E[v_(1)] =
# L + W n/(n+1). If bidders expect it, they bid as in first-price
# and the house is back to the honest mean: the gain exists only
# while the deception is hidden, which is why it is fraud.
import math
import random
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
L, H, N, RUNS = 80000, 160000, 4, 20000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [sorted((rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
for _ in range(RUNS)]
print("A. overbidding factor, mean price, P(regret), mean regret")
for d in (0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15):
prices, regrets = [], []
for v in draws:
p = min(v[1] * (1 + d), v[0] * (1 + d))
prices.append(p)
regrets.append(max(0.0, p - v[0]))
hit = len([x for x in regrets if x > 0]) / RUNS
pos = [x for x in regrets if x > 0]
mr = math.fsum(pos) / len(pos) if pos else 0.0
print(" d = %.2f price %7.0f P(regret) %.4f regret %6.0f"
% (d, math.fsum(prices) / RUNS, hit, mr))
W = H - L
honest = L + W * Fr(N - 1, N + 1)
shill = L + W * Fr(N, N + 1)
surplus = W * Fr(1, N + 1)
print("B. honest second-price mean %d, with a hidden shill %d"
% (honest, shill))
print(" transfer from the winning client per sale: %d yuan" % surplus)
print(" winner's expected surplus: honest %d, shill 0" % surplus)
print(" if shills are expected: bids fall to first-price, mean %d"
% (L + Fr(N - 1, N) * (W * Fr(N, N + 1))))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test