What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price”?

Answer: Chapter 6 extends the single piece to limited seats: with twice as many applicants as seats, the (k+1)-th price earns 1.0806 times the optimal posted price.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 1.0806

knbest posted pprofitauction r*auction/postedP(lot)
443500062500625001.00000.0000
48410001037781121391.08060.3101
412450001249991384991.10800.4897
88350001250001250001.00000.0000
816410002169632311841.06550.3257
824455002621802848021.08630.5259
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: a posted seat price versus the (k+1)-th price rule.
# Same circle as p61: seat values iid U[20,000, 60,000] yuan, cost
# c = 10,000 per seat (illustrative). Posted price p: every applicant
# with v >= p accepts; if more than k accept, seats go by public lot.
# Expected profit = (p - c) * E[min(k, Binomial(n, 1 - F(p)))], exact
# sum over the binomial with math.fsum; p searched on a 500-yuan grid.
# Auction: (k+1)-th price with reserve r* = 35,000 (p61 formula).
# Also reported: P(lot), the chance that more than k accept, so that a
# public lot may seat a lower-value applicant ahead of a higher one.
import math

L, H, C = 20000.0, 60000.0, 10000.0
W = H - L


def posted(k, n, p):
    q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
    terms = [math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j) * min(k, j)
             for j in range(n + 1)]
    return (p - C) * math.fsum(terms)


def p_top(v, k, n):
    F = (v - L) / W
    return math.fsum(math.comb(n - 1, j) * (1 - F) ** j
                     * F ** (n - 1 - j) for j in range(min(k, n)))


def auction(k, n, r=35000.0, m=2000):
    h = (H - r) / m
    t = []
    for i in range(m + 1):
        v = r + i * h
        w = 1 if i in (0, m) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
        t.append(w * (2.0 * v - H - C) * p_top(v, k, n) / W)
    return n * h / 3.0 * math.fsum(t)


def over(k, n, p):
    q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
    return math.fsum(math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j)
                     for j in range(k + 1, n + 1))


print("k  n   best posted p  profit   auction r*  auction/posted"
      "  P(lot)")
for k in (4, 8):
    for n in (k, 2 * k, 3 * k):
        grid = [20000.0 + 500.0 * i for i in range(81)]
        p = max(grid, key=lambda x: (posted(k, n, x), -x))
        a = auction(k, n)
        print("%d  %-2d  %9.0f      %7.0f  %8.0f    %.4f          %.4f"
              % (k, n, p, posted(k, n, p), a, a / posted(k, n, p),
                 over(k, n, p)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book