What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price”?
Answer: Chapter 6 extends the single piece to limited seats: with twice as many applicants as seats, the (k+1)-th price earns 1.0806 times the optimal posted price.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 1.0806
| k | n | best posted p | profit | auction r* | auction/posted | P(lot) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | 4 | 35000 | 62500 | 62500 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 4 | 8 | 41000 | 103778 | 112139 | 1.0806 | 0.3101 |
| 4 | 12 | 45000 | 124999 | 138499 | 1.1080 | 0.4897 |
| 8 | 8 | 35000 | 125000 | 125000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 8 | 16 | 41000 | 216963 | 231184 | 1.0655 | 0.3257 |
| 8 | 24 | 45500 | 262180 | 284802 | 1.0863 | 0.5259 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: a posted seat price versus the (k+1)-th price rule.
# Same circle as p61: seat values iid U[20,000, 60,000] yuan, cost
# c = 10,000 per seat (illustrative). Posted price p: every applicant
# with v >= p accepts; if more than k accept, seats go by public lot.
# Expected profit = (p - c) * E[min(k, Binomial(n, 1 - F(p)))], exact
# sum over the binomial with math.fsum; p searched on a 500-yuan grid.
# Auction: (k+1)-th price with reserve r* = 35,000 (p61 formula).
# Also reported: P(lot), the chance that more than k accept, so that a
# public lot may seat a lower-value applicant ahead of a higher one.
import math
L, H, C = 20000.0, 60000.0, 10000.0
W = H - L
def posted(k, n, p):
q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
terms = [math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j) * min(k, j)
for j in range(n + 1)]
return (p - C) * math.fsum(terms)
def p_top(v, k, n):
F = (v - L) / W
return math.fsum(math.comb(n - 1, j) * (1 - F) ** j
* F ** (n - 1 - j) for j in range(min(k, n)))
def auction(k, n, r=35000.0, m=2000):
h = (H - r) / m
t = []
for i in range(m + 1):
v = r + i * h
w = 1 if i in (0, m) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
t.append(w * (2.0 * v - H - C) * p_top(v, k, n) / W)
return n * h / 3.0 * math.fsum(t)
def over(k, n, p):
q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
return math.fsum(math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j)
for j in range(k + 1, n + 1))
print("k n best posted p profit auction r* auction/posted"
" P(lot)")
for k in (4, 8):
for n in (k, 2 * k, 3 * k):
grid = [20000.0 + 500.0 * i for i in range(81)]
p = max(grid, key=lambda x: (posted(k, n, x), -x))
a = auction(k, n)
print("%d %-2d %9.0f %7.0f %8.0f %.4f %.4f"
% (k, n, p, posted(k, n, p), a, a / posted(k, n, p),
over(k, n, p)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test