What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence”?
Answer: Chapter 1 checks revenue equivalence by exact integration in fractions, and uses twenty thousand simulations on common random numbers to show the same mean with different risk: the standard deviation of the price is 16185 yuan for the second-price sealed bid and 9930 yuan for the first-price one.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 16185, 9930
| exact expected revenue (all four, continuous): 128000 | |||||
| format | mean | 95% CI half | sd | P(<110k) | p05 |
| second-price | 127926 | 224 | 16185 | 0.1553 | 99343 |
| English | 128400 | 224 | 16172 | 0.1431 | 100000 |
| first-price | 127873 | 138 | 9930 | 0.0652 | 107944 |
| Dutch | 127370 | 138 | 9928 | 0.0652 | 107000 |
| exact sd: second-price 16000, first-price 9798 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: same mean, different spread - a seeded Monte Carlo.
# One-of-a-kind bag, n = 4 qualified bidders, private values iid
# uniform on [80,000, 160,000] yuan (illustrative). 20,000 auctions per
# format, the same value draws for every format (common random numbers).
# Second-price: truthful bids, price = second value. English: clock
# rises in steps of 1,000 yuan, price = first step at which only one
# bidder is left. First-price: equilibrium bid L + (n-1)/n (v - L).
# Dutch: clock falls in steps of 1,000, the first bidder whose bid is
# reached stops it, price = that clock level.
import math
import random
L, H, N, RUNS, STEP = 80000, 160000, 4, 20000, 1000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [sorted((rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
for _ in range(RUNS)]
def english(v):
up = L + STEP * math.ceil((v[1] - L) / STEP)
return up if v[0] >= up else up - STEP
def first(v):
return L + (N - 1) / N * (v[0] - L)
def dutch(v):
return H - STEP * math.ceil((H - first(v)) / STEP)
FORMATS = [("second-price", lambda v: v[1]), ("English", english),
("first-price", first), ("Dutch", dutch)]
exact = L + (H - L) * (N - 1) / (N + 1)
print("exact expected revenue (all four, continuous): %.0f" % exact)
print("format mean 95% CI half sd P(<110k) p05")
for name, rule in FORMATS:
rev = sorted(rule(v) for v in draws)
mean = math.fsum(rev) / RUNS
var = math.fsum((r - mean) ** 2 for r in rev) / (RUNS - 1)
sd = math.sqrt(var)
half = 1.96 * sd / math.sqrt(RUNS)
low = len([r for r in rev if r < 110000]) / RUNS
print("%-12s %7.0f %6.0f %6.0f %.4f %6.0f"
% (name, mean, half, sd, low, rev[RUNS // 20]))
sd2 = (H - L) * math.sqrt(2 * (N - 1) / ((N + 1) ** 2 * (N + 2)))
sd1 = (H - L) * (N - 1) / N * math.sqrt(N / ((N + 1) ** 2 * (N + 2)))
print("exact sd: second-price %.0f, first-price %.0f" % (sd2, sd1))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test