What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence”?

Answer: Chapter 1 checks revenue equivalence by exact integration in fractions, and uses twenty thousand simulations on common random numbers to show the same mean with different risk: the standard deviation of the price is 16185 yuan for the second-price sealed bid and 9930 yuan for the first-price one.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 16185, 9930

exact expected revenue (all four, continuous): 128000
formatmean95% CI halfsdP(<110k)p05
second-price127926224161850.155399343
English128400224161720.1431100000
first-price12787313899300.0652107944
Dutch12737013899280.0652107000
exact sd: second-price 16000, first-price 9798
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: same mean, different spread - a seeded Monte Carlo.
# One-of-a-kind bag, n = 4 qualified bidders, private values iid
# uniform on [80,000, 160,000] yuan (illustrative). 20,000 auctions per
# format, the same value draws for every format (common random numbers).
# Second-price: truthful bids, price = second value. English: clock
# rises in steps of 1,000 yuan, price = first step at which only one
# bidder is left. First-price: equilibrium bid L + (n-1)/n (v - L).
# Dutch: clock falls in steps of 1,000, the first bidder whose bid is
# reached stops it, price = that clock level.
import math
import random

L, H, N, RUNS, STEP = 80000, 160000, 4, 20000, 1000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [sorted((rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
         for _ in range(RUNS)]


def english(v):
    up = L + STEP * math.ceil((v[1] - L) / STEP)
    return up if v[0] >= up else up - STEP


def first(v):
    return L + (N - 1) / N * (v[0] - L)


def dutch(v):
    return H - STEP * math.ceil((H - first(v)) / STEP)


FORMATS = [("second-price", lambda v: v[1]), ("English", english),
           ("first-price", first), ("Dutch", dutch)]
exact = L + (H - L) * (N - 1) / (N + 1)
print("exact expected revenue (all four, continuous): %.0f" % exact)
print("format        mean     95% CI half   sd      P(<110k)  p05")
for name, rule in FORMATS:
    rev = sorted(rule(v) for v in draws)
    mean = math.fsum(rev) / RUNS
    var = math.fsum((r - mean) ** 2 for r in rev) / (RUNS - 1)
    sd = math.sqrt(var)
    half = 1.96 * sd / math.sqrt(RUNS)
    low = len([r for r in rev if r < 110000]) / RUNS
    print("%-12s %7.0f   %6.0f       %6.0f   %.4f    %6.0f"
          % (name, mean, half, sd, low, rev[RUNS // 20]))
sd2 = (H - L) * math.sqrt(2 * (N - 1) / ((N + 1) ** 2 * (N + 2)))
sd1 = (H - L) * (N - 1) / N * math.sqrt(N / ((N + 1) ** 2 * (N + 2)))
print("exact sd: second-price %.0f, first-price %.0f" % (sd2, sd1))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book