Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats: chapter answers
When a one-of-a-kind handbag or a set of limited seats is sold, the trade holds two intuitions: format sets the price, and a floor is a mind game, best omitted or set as high as possible. This book refutes their shared premise. With independent, symmetric, private values and risk-neutral buyers, the English, Dutch, first-price and second-price formats have the same expected revenue; what systematically raises expected revenue is a reserve set by virtual value, worth more the fewer the buyers; and attracting one more genuine, qualified buyer is often worth more than getting the reserve exactly…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
Chapter 1 checks revenue equivalence by exact integration in fractions, and uses twenty thousand simulations on common random numbers to show the same mean with different risk: the standard deviation of the price is 161… - Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
Chapter 2 introduces virtual values and the optimal reserve: under uniform values the relative gain from the reserve falls from 0.2500 with two buyers to 0.0078 with five, but with an exponential tail the gain rises fro… - Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
Chapter 3 draws up the bill for a reserve: with three buyers the chance of no sale rises to 0.2441, and buyers give up 1.868 yuan for every 1 yuan the owner gains. - Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
Chapter 4 covers truth-telling, overbidding and shill bids (a hidden shill takes 16,000 yuan from each winner) and locks bids and reserve with SHA-256 commitment and reveal. - Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
Chapter 5 discusses where revenue equivalence breaks: risk aversion, correlated values and bidding rings, with the optimal reserve absorbing 0.6333 of the loss from a ring of three. - Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
Chapter 6 extends the single piece to limited seats: with twice as many applicants as seats, the (k+1)-th price earns 1.0806 times the optimal posted price. - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
Chapter 7 examines tax-farm bidding in the Song shi with Su Zhe's proposal to fix a middle price and ban outbidding (in an illustrative model, bidding one's own estimate gives a chance of default of 0.9691), and the Bab… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test
Chapter 8 gives a six-step sealed-bid procedure, a public notice for second-price seats, the Sealed-Bid Reserve Price Calculator and a pre-registered test plan: with three buyers the no-sale test needs 33 pieces per gro…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote