What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth”?

Answer: Chapter 2 introduces virtual values and the optimal reserve: under uniform values the relative gain from the reserve falls from 0.2500 with two buyers to 0.0078 with five, but with an exponential tail the gain rises from 5,666 yuan with one buyer to 6,843 yuan with two, a correction to the project blueprint; one more genuine buyer beats the optimal reserve in every case when the seller's own value is zero, and the result reverses when that value is high and values have a long tail.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0078, 0.2500, 5666, 6843

A. uniform [0,1], s0, r* = 1/2 (exact)
n no reserve with r* gain gain / no-reserve
10 1/4 1/4 inf
21/3 5/12 1/12 0.2500
31/2 17/32 1/32 0.0625
43/5 49/80 1/80 0.0208
52/3 43/64 1/192 0.0078
65/7 321/448 1/448 0.0031
73/4 769/1024 1/1024 0.0013
87/9 1793/2304 1/2304 0.0006
B. seller value s100,000 yuan; payoff with r = s vs r = r*
n law r = s r = r* gain gain / base
1 uniform100000 111250 11250 0.1125
2 uniform111250 119688 8438 0.0758
3 uniform121094 126104 5010 0.0414
5 uniform133398 134923 1524 0.0114
8 uniform142223 142481 258 0.0018
1 power100000 118519 18519 0.1852
2 power123484 129778 6293 0.0510
3 power134903 136914 2011 0.0149
5 power144647 144888 242 0.0017
8 power150275 150288 13 0.0001
1 exp100000 105666 5666 0.0567
2 exp103954 110797 6843 0.0658
3 exp109155 115461 6306 0.0578
5 exp119433 123608 4175 0.0350
8 exp131639 133527 1888 0.0143

Key formula

\[\varphi(v) = v - \frac{1 - F(v)}{f(v)}.\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p22: the fewer the buyers, the more the reserve is worth.
# Part A, exact: values U[0, 1], seller value 0, reserve r = 1/2.
#   no reserve:  R0(n) = (n-1)/(n+1)
#   with r:      R(n, r) = R0(n) + r^n - 2n r^(n+1)/(n+1)
# so the gain is 2^-n / (n+1), in exact fractions.
# Part B, numeric: bag values on [80,000, 160,000]-type laws of p21,
# seller value s = 100,000. Expected seller payoff (price if sold, s if
# kept) = s F(r)^n + n * int_r^top phi(v) F(v)^(n-1) f(v) dv, by
# composite Simpson with math.fsum. Baseline: reserve = s ("never below
# what it is worth to me"); policy: reserve = r* from p21.
import math
from fractions import Fraction as Fr

print("A. uniform [0,1], s = 0, r* = 1/2 (exact)")
print("n  no reserve  with r*   gain      gain / no-reserve")
for n in range(1, 9):
    r0 = Fr(n - 1, n + 1)
    g = Fr(1, 2 ** n * (n + 1))
    rel = "inf" if r0 == 0 else "%.4f" % float(g / r0)
    print("%d  %-10s  %-8s  %-8s  %s" % (n, r0, r0 + g, g, rel))

L, W, THETA, S = 80000.0, 80000.0, 30000.0, 100000.0
LAWS = {
    "uniform": (lambda v: (v - L) / W, lambda v: 1.0 / W, L + W, 130000.0),
    "power": (lambda v: ((v - L) / W) ** 2,
              lambda v: 2.0 * (v - L) / W / W, L + W, 400000.0 / 3.0),
    "exp": (lambda v: 1.0 - math.exp(-(v - L) / THETA),
            lambda v: math.exp(-(v - L) / THETA) / THETA,
            L + 20 * THETA, 130000.0)}


def payoff(law, n, r, s=S, k=2000):
    F, f, top, _ = LAWS[law]
    h = (top - r) / k
    terms = []
    for i in range(k + 1):
        v = r + i * h
        fv = f(v)
        phi = v - (1.0 - F(v)) / fv if fv > 0 else 0.0
        w = 1 if i in (0, k) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
        terms.append(w * phi * F(v) ** (n - 1) * fv)
    return s * F(r) ** n + n * h / 3.0 * math.fsum(terms)


print("B. seller value s = 100,000 yuan; payoff with r = s vs r = r*")
print("n   law      r = s     r = r*    gain    gain / base")
for law in ("uniform", "power", "exp"):
    rstar = LAWS[law][3]
    for n in (1, 2, 3, 5, 8):
        base = payoff(law, n, S)
        best = payoff(law, n, rstar)
        print("%d   %-7s  %7.0f   %7.0f   %5.0f   %.4f"
              % (n, law, base, best, best - base, (best - base) / base))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book