What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth”?
Answer: Chapter 2 introduces virtual values and the optimal reserve: under uniform values the relative gain from the reserve falls from 0.2500 with two buyers to 0.0078 with five, but with an exponential tail the gain rises from 5,666 yuan with one buyer to 6,843 yuan with two, a correction to the project blueprint; one more genuine buyer beats the optimal reserve in every case when the seller's own value is zero, and the result reverses when that value is high and values have a long tail.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0078, 0.2500, 5666, 6843
| A. uniform [0,1], s | 0, r* = 1/2 (exact) |
| n no reserve with r* gain gain / no-reserve | |
| 1 | 0 1/4 1/4 inf |
| 2 | 1/3 5/12 1/12 0.2500 |
| 3 | 1/2 17/32 1/32 0.0625 |
| 4 | 3/5 49/80 1/80 0.0208 |
| 5 | 2/3 43/64 1/192 0.0078 |
| 6 | 5/7 321/448 1/448 0.0031 |
| 7 | 3/4 769/1024 1/1024 0.0013 |
| 8 | 7/9 1793/2304 1/2304 0.0006 |
| B. seller value s | 100,000 yuan; payoff with r = s vs r = r* |
| n law r = s r = r* gain gain / base | |
| 1 uniform | 100000 111250 11250 0.1125 |
| 2 uniform | 111250 119688 8438 0.0758 |
| 3 uniform | 121094 126104 5010 0.0414 |
| 5 uniform | 133398 134923 1524 0.0114 |
| 8 uniform | 142223 142481 258 0.0018 |
| 1 power | 100000 118519 18519 0.1852 |
| 2 power | 123484 129778 6293 0.0510 |
| 3 power | 134903 136914 2011 0.0149 |
| 5 power | 144647 144888 242 0.0017 |
| 8 power | 150275 150288 13 0.0001 |
| 1 exp | 100000 105666 5666 0.0567 |
| 2 exp | 103954 110797 6843 0.0658 |
| 3 exp | 109155 115461 6306 0.0578 |
| 5 exp | 119433 123608 4175 0.0350 |
| 8 exp | 131639 133527 1888 0.0143 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p22: the fewer the buyers, the more the reserve is worth.
# Part A, exact: values U[0, 1], seller value 0, reserve r = 1/2.
# no reserve: R0(n) = (n-1)/(n+1)
# with r: R(n, r) = R0(n) + r^n - 2n r^(n+1)/(n+1)
# so the gain is 2^-n / (n+1), in exact fractions.
# Part B, numeric: bag values on [80,000, 160,000]-type laws of p21,
# seller value s = 100,000. Expected seller payoff (price if sold, s if
# kept) = s F(r)^n + n * int_r^top phi(v) F(v)^(n-1) f(v) dv, by
# composite Simpson with math.fsum. Baseline: reserve = s ("never below
# what it is worth to me"); policy: reserve = r* from p21.
import math
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
print("A. uniform [0,1], s = 0, r* = 1/2 (exact)")
print("n no reserve with r* gain gain / no-reserve")
for n in range(1, 9):
r0 = Fr(n - 1, n + 1)
g = Fr(1, 2 ** n * (n + 1))
rel = "inf" if r0 == 0 else "%.4f" % float(g / r0)
print("%d %-10s %-8s %-8s %s" % (n, r0, r0 + g, g, rel))
L, W, THETA, S = 80000.0, 80000.0, 30000.0, 100000.0
LAWS = {
"uniform": (lambda v: (v - L) / W, lambda v: 1.0 / W, L + W, 130000.0),
"power": (lambda v: ((v - L) / W) ** 2,
lambda v: 2.0 * (v - L) / W / W, L + W, 400000.0 / 3.0),
"exp": (lambda v: 1.0 - math.exp(-(v - L) / THETA),
lambda v: math.exp(-(v - L) / THETA) / THETA,
L + 20 * THETA, 130000.0)}
def payoff(law, n, r, s=S, k=2000):
F, f, top, _ = LAWS[law]
h = (top - r) / k
terms = []
for i in range(k + 1):
v = r + i * h
fv = f(v)
phi = v - (1.0 - F(v)) / fv if fv > 0 else 0.0
w = 1 if i in (0, k) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
terms.append(w * phi * F(v) ** (n - 1) * fv)
return s * F(r) ** n + n * h / 3.0 * math.fsum(terms)
print("B. seller value s = 100,000 yuan; payoff with r = s vs r = r*")
print("n law r = s r = r* gain gain / base")
for law in ("uniform", "power", "exp"):
rstar = LAWS[law][3]
for n in (1, 2, 3, 5, 8):
base = payoff(law, n, S)
best = payoff(law, n, rstar)
print("%d %-7s %7.0f %7.0f %5.0f %.4f"
% (n, law, base, best, best - base, (best - base) / base))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 5 · When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test