What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments”?
Answer: Chapter 5 discusses where revenue equivalence breaks: risk aversion, correlated values and bidding rings, with the optimal reserve absorbing 0.6333 of the loss from a ring of three.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.6333
| ring k | reserve = s | reserve = r* | r* protects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 133319 | 134884 | 1566 |
| 2 | 132042 | 134350 | 2309 |
| 3 | 128359 | 133066 | 4707 |
| 4 | 119766 | 130794 | 11028 |
| 5 | 100000 | 127122 | 27122 |
| ring of 3 costs the house 4960 with reserve s, 1819 with r* | |||
| share of the loss the reserve absorbs: 0.6333 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: a bidding ring and what a reserve does against it.
# n = 5 bidders, values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, house value
# s = 100,000, optimal reserve r* = 130,000 from p21 (illustrative).
# A ring of k members sends only its highest member to the
# second-price auction; the others stay out.
# The house sees fewer real bids. Seeded Monte Carlo, 20,000 lots,
# same draws for every row. Payoff = price if sold, s if kept.
# This models the house's exposure; it is not advice to anyone on how
# to form a ring, which is unlawful in many jurisdictions.
import math
import random
L, H, N, S, RUNS = 80000.0, 160000.0, 5, 100000.0, 20000
RSTAR = 130000.0
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [[rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)] for _ in range(RUNS)]
def lot(vals, k, r):
eff = sorted([max(vals[:k])] + vals[k:], reverse=True)
if eff[0] < r:
return S
second = eff[1] if len(eff) > 1 else r
return max(second, r)
print("ring k reserve = s reserve = r* r* protects")
rows = {}
for k in range(1, N + 1):
a = math.fsum(lot(v, k, S) for v in draws) / RUNS
b = math.fsum(lot(v, k, RSTAR) for v in draws) / RUNS
rows[k] = (a, b)
print("%d %9.0f %9.0f %6.0f" % (k, a, b, b - a))
a1, b1 = rows[1]
a3, b3 = rows[3]
print("ring of 3 costs the house %.0f with reserve s, %.0f with r*"
% (a1 - a3, b1 - b3))
print("share of the loss the reserve absorbs: %.4f"
% (1 - (b1 - b3) / (a1 - a3)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One Expectation for Four Formats: Exact Integration and Monte Carlo for Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 2 · Virtual Values and Myerson's Reserve: the Fewer the Buyers, the More the Floor Is Worth
- Chapter 3 · The Bill for a Reserve: No-Sales, Forgone Trades and the Wrong Distribution
- Chapter 4 · The Truthful Sealed Bid: Dominant Strategies, Overbidding, Shill Bids and Commit-Reveal
- Chapter 6 · Limited Seats: the (k+1)-th Price for k Identical Seats, Compared with a Posted Price
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Song Tax-Farm Bidding and Herodotus's Babylonian Marriage Auction
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Sealed-Bid Procedure for Unique Pieces, a Public Second-Price Rule for Seats, and a Pre-Registered Test