What does Sealed Bids and Optimal Reserves conclude, in numbers, about “When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments”?

Answer: Chapter 5 discusses where revenue equivalence breaks: risk aversion, correlated values and bidding rings, with the optimal reserve absorbing 0.6333 of the loss from a ring of three.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.6333

ring kreserve = sreserve = r*r* protects
11333191348841566
21320421343502309
31283591330664707
411976613079411028
510000012712227122
ring of 3 costs the house 4960 with reserve s, 1819 with r*
share of the loss the reserve absorbs: 0.6333
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: a bidding ring and what a reserve does against it.
# n = 5 bidders, values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, house value
# s = 100,000, optimal reserve r* = 130,000 from p21 (illustrative).
# A ring of k members sends only its highest member to the
# second-price auction; the others stay out.
# The house sees fewer real bids. Seeded Monte Carlo, 20,000 lots,
# same draws for every row. Payoff = price if sold, s if kept.
# This models the house's exposure; it is not advice to anyone on how
# to form a ring, which is unlawful in many jurisdictions.
import math
import random

L, H, N, S, RUNS = 80000.0, 160000.0, 5, 100000.0, 20000
RSTAR = 130000.0
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [[rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)] for _ in range(RUNS)]


def lot(vals, k, r):
    eff = sorted([max(vals[:k])] + vals[k:], reverse=True)
    if eff[0] < r:
        return S
    second = eff[1] if len(eff) > 1 else r
    return max(second, r)


print("ring k  reserve = s   reserve = r*   r* protects")
rows = {}
for k in range(1, N + 1):
    a = math.fsum(lot(v, k, S) for v in draws) / RUNS
    b = math.fsum(lot(v, k, RSTAR) for v in draws) / RUNS
    rows[k] = (a, b)
    print("%d       %9.0f     %9.0f      %6.0f" % (k, a, b, b - a))
a1, b1 = rows[1]
a3, b3 = rows[3]
print("ring of 3 costs the house %.0f with reserve s, %.0f with r*"
      % (a1 - a3, b1 - b3))
print("share of the loss the reserve absorbs: %.4f"
      % (1 - (b1 - b3) / (a1 - a3)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: When Equivalence Breaks: Risk Aversion, Bidding Rings and Field Experiments. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book