关于「等价何时破裂:风险厌恶、围标与实地实验」,《二价暗标与最优保留价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第五章讨论收入等价破裂的情形:风险厌恶、估值相关与围标,最优保留价能挡住三人围标损失的 0.6333。
数据口径:书中的估值分布、保有价值、买家人数与价格均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,也不是法律意见,正式拍卖以上架前人工复核的当地法规为准;紧迫感只能来自真实库存与真实截止,不虚构竞价者,不托价。 第七章考辨《宋史》的买扑与苏辙「立定中价,不许添刬」之议(示意模型中按自身估计出价的违约概率达 0.9691)以及希罗多德记载的巴比伦婚配拍卖(收入是嫁资的 3.373 倍)。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.6333
| ring k | reserve = s | reserve = r* | r* protects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 133319 | 134884 | 1566 |
| 2 | 132042 | 134350 | 2309 |
| 3 | 128359 | 133066 | 4707 |
| 4 | 119766 | 130794 | 11028 |
| 5 | 100000 | 127122 | 27122 |
| ring of 3 costs the house 4960 with reserve s, 1819 with r* | |||
| share of the loss the reserve absorbs: 0.6333 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p52: a bidding ring and what a reserve does against it.
# n = 5 bidders, values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, house value
# s = 100,000, optimal reserve r* = 130,000 from p21 (illustrative).
# A ring of k members sends only its highest member to the
# second-price auction; the others stay out.
# The house sees fewer real bids. Seeded Monte Carlo, 20,000 lots,
# same draws for every row. Payoff = price if sold, s if kept.
# This models the house's exposure; it is not advice to anyone on how
# to form a ring, which is unlawful in many jurisdictions.
import math
import random
L, H, N, S, RUNS = 80000.0, 160000.0, 5, 100000.0, 20000
RSTAR = 130000.0
rng = random.Random(20261113)
draws = [[rng.uniform(L, H) for _ in range(N)] for _ in range(RUNS)]
def lot(vals, k, r):
eff = sorted([max(vals[:k])] + vals[k:], reverse=True)
if eff[0] < r:
return S
second = eff[1] if len(eff) > 1 else r
return max(second, r)
print("ring k reserve = s reserve = r* r* protects")
rows = {}
for k in range(1, N + 1):
a = math.fsum(lot(v, k, S) for v in draws) / RUNS
b = math.fsum(lot(v, k, RSTAR) for v in draws) / RUNS
rows[k] = (a, b)
print("%d %9.0f %9.0f %6.0f" % (k, a, b, b - a))
a1, b1 = rows[1]
a3, b3 = rows[3]
print("ring of 3 costs the house %.0f with reserve s, %.0f with r*"
% (a1 - a3, b1 - b3))
print("share of the loss the reserve absorbs: %.4f"
% (1 - (b1 - b3) / (a1 - a3)))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《维克里二价暗标、迈尔森最优保留价与孤品奢包限量席位激励相容拍卖母典》第 5 章「等价何时破裂:风险厌恶、围标与实地实验」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}