关于「东西方原典考辨:宋代买扑与希罗多德的巴比伦婚配拍卖」,《二价暗标与最优保留价》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第七章考辨《宋史》的买扑与苏辙「立定中价,不许添刬」之议(示意模型中按自身估计出价的违约概率达 0.9691)以及希罗多德记载的巴比伦婚配拍卖(收入是嫁资的 3.373 倍)。

数据口径:书中的估值分布、保有价值、买家人数与价格均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,也不是法律意见,正式拍卖以上架前人工复核的当地法规为准;紧迫感只能来自真实库存与真实截止,不虚构竞价者,不托价。 第七章考辨《宋史》的买扑与苏辙「立定中价,不许添刬」之议(示意模型中按自身估计出价的违约概率达 0.9691)以及希罗多德记载的巴比伦婚配拍卖(收入是嫁资的 3.373 倍)。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.9691

Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = 280; minus 150 leaves 130 (wan guan)
rulemean paymean VP(default)overpay
sealed own estimate899.7800.00.9691103.7
open outbidding849.6800.00.809069.2
shaded for the curse799.7800.00.591828.3
fixed 2/3 price566.4800.00.00000.0
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p71: Song-dynasty tax-farm bidding as a common-value lot.
# Su Zhe's figures (Song shi, juan 177, in wan guan, i.e. 10,000 guan):
# a year of farm revenue about 420; fixing a middle price and banning
# outbidding, "cut by one third", still leaves about 280; the costs it
# had to cover about 150. Checked with exact fractions below.
# Model (illustrative, not a reconstruction): a farm's true yearly
# take V ~ U[600, 1000] guan, the same for all; n = 5 bidders each see
# a signal x = V + e, e ~ U[-150, 150]. Rules compared over 20,000
# seeded lots: sealed bid of one's own estimate (pay top signal); open
# outbidding (pay second signal); bids shaded for the winner's curse,
# x - 150 (n - 1)/(n + 1); a fixed middle price of 2/3 of the
# outbid price. "Default" = the farmer owes more than V.
import math
import random
from fractions import Fraction as Fr

total, kept, cost = Fr(420), Fr(420) * (1 - Fr(1, 3)), Fr(150)
print("Su Zhe: 420 * (1 - 1/3) = %s; minus 150 leaves %s (wan guan)"
      % (kept, kept - cost))
N, E, RUNS = 5, 150.0, 20000
rng = random.Random(20261113)
rows = {"sealed own estimate": [], "open outbidding": [],
        "shaded for the curse": [], "fixed 2/3 price": []}
for _ in range(RUNS):
    v = rng.uniform(600.0, 1000.0)
    x = sorted((v + rng.uniform(-E, E) for _ in range(N)), reverse=True)
    shade = E * (N - 1) / (N + 1)
    for name, pay in (("sealed own estimate", x[0]),
                      ("open outbidding", x[1]),
                      ("shaded for the curse", x[0] - shade),
                      ("fixed 2/3 price", x[1] * 2.0 / 3.0)):
        rows[name].append((pay, v))
print("rule                   mean pay  mean V   P(default)  overpay")
for name in ("sealed own estimate", "open outbidding",
             "shaded for the curse", "fixed 2/3 price"):
    r = rows[name]
    pay = math.fsum(p for p, _ in r) / RUNS
    val = math.fsum(v for _, v in r) / RUNS
    bad = [p - v for p, v in r if p > v]
    print("%-21s  %7.1f   %6.1f   %.4f      %5.1f"
          % (name, pay, val, len(bad) / RUNS,
             math.fsum(bad) / len(bad) if bad else 0.0))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《维克里二价暗标、迈尔森最优保留价与孤品奢包限量席位激励相容拍卖母典》第 7 章「东西方原典考辨:宋代买扑与希罗多德的巴比伦婚配拍卖」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论