关于「限量席位:k 个相同席位的第 k+1 价与标价对照」,《二价暗标与最优保留价》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第六章把单件推广到限量席位:申请者为席位两倍时,第 k+1 价的利润是最优标价的 1.0806 倍。

数据口径:书中的估值分布、保有价值、买家人数与价格均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,也不是法律意见,正式拍卖以上架前人工复核的当地法规为准;紧迫感只能来自真实库存与真实截止,不虚构竞价者,不托价。 第七章考辨《宋史》的买扑与苏辙「立定中价,不许添刬」之议(示意模型中按自身估计出价的违约概率达 0.9691)以及希罗多德记载的巴比伦婚配拍卖(收入是嫁资的 3.373 倍)。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 1.0806

knbest posted pprofitauction r*auction/postedP(lot)
443500062500625001.00000.0000
48410001037781121391.08060.3101
412450001249991384991.10800.4897
88350001250001250001.00000.0000
816410002169632311841.06550.3257
824455002621802848021.08630.5259
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p62: a posted seat price versus the (k+1)-th price rule.
# Same circle as p61: seat values iid U[20,000, 60,000] yuan, cost
# c = 10,000 per seat (illustrative). Posted price p: every applicant
# with v >= p accepts; if more than k accept, seats go by public lot.
# Expected profit = (p - c) * E[min(k, Binomial(n, 1 - F(p)))], exact
# sum over the binomial with math.fsum; p searched on a 500-yuan grid.
# Auction: (k+1)-th price with reserve r* = 35,000 (p61 formula).
# Also reported: P(lot), the chance that more than k accept, so that a
# public lot may seat a lower-value applicant ahead of a higher one.
import math

L, H, C = 20000.0, 60000.0, 10000.0
W = H - L


def posted(k, n, p):
    q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
    terms = [math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j) * min(k, j)
             for j in range(n + 1)]
    return (p - C) * math.fsum(terms)


def p_top(v, k, n):
    F = (v - L) / W
    return math.fsum(math.comb(n - 1, j) * (1 - F) ** j
                     * F ** (n - 1 - j) for j in range(min(k, n)))


def auction(k, n, r=35000.0, m=2000):
    h = (H - r) / m
    t = []
    for i in range(m + 1):
        v = r + i * h
        w = 1 if i in (0, m) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
        t.append(w * (2.0 * v - H - C) * p_top(v, k, n) / W)
    return n * h / 3.0 * math.fsum(t)


def over(k, n, p):
    q = 1.0 - (p - L) / W
    return math.fsum(math.comb(n, j) * q ** j * (1 - q) ** (n - j)
                     for j in range(k + 1, n + 1))


print("k  n   best posted p  profit   auction r*  auction/posted"
      "  P(lot)")
for k in (4, 8):
    for n in (k, 2 * k, 3 * k):
        grid = [20000.0 + 500.0 * i for i in range(81)]
        p = max(grid, key=lambda x: (posted(k, n, x), -x))
        a = auction(k, n)
        print("%d  %-2d  %9.0f      %7.0f  %8.0f    %.4f          %.4f"
              % (k, n, p, posted(k, n, p), a, a / posted(k, n, p),
                 over(k, n, p)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《维克里二价暗标、迈尔森最优保留价与孤品奢包限量席位激励相容拍卖母典》第 6 章「限量席位:k 个相同席位的第 k+1 价与标价对照」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论