关于「保留价的账单:流拍、被放弃的成交与看错分布」,《二价暗标与最优保留价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第三章算保留价的账单:三位买家时流拍概率升到 0.2441,店主每多拿 1 元,买家付出 1.868 元。
数据口径:书中的估值分布、保有价值、买家人数与价格均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,也不是法律意见,正式拍卖以上架前人工复核的当地法规为准;紧迫感只能来自真实库存与真实截止,不虚构竞价者,不托价。 第七章考辨《宋史》的买扑与苏辙「立定中价,不许添刬」之议(示意模型中按自身估计出价的违约概率达 0.9691)以及希罗多德记载的巴比伦婚配拍卖(收入是嫁资的 3.373 倍)。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.2441, 1.868
| n | P(no sale) r=s | P(no sale) r* | seller gain | lost surplus | buyers lose |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.2500 | 0.6250 | 11250 | 5625 | 16875 |
| 2 | 0.0625 | 0.3906 | 8438 | 5625 | 14062 |
| 3 | 0.0156 | 0.2441 | 5010 | 4351 | 9360 |
| 4 | 0.0039 | 0.1526 | 2786 | 3067 | 5854 |
| 5 | 0.0010 | 0.0954 | 1524 | 2070 | 3594 |
| 6 | 0.0002 | 0.0596 | 835 | 1363 | 2199 |
| 8 | 0.0000 | 0.0233 | 258 | 569 | 827 |
| n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers 1.868 yuan | |||||
| n = 3: gain 320625/64 yuan, lost surplus 556875/128 yuan (exact) |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p31: what the optimal reserve costs, and who pays for it.
# Bag values iid U[80,000, 160,000] yuan, seller value s = 100,000
# (illustrative: what the house can realise by keeping the bag).
# Compare reserve r = s (efficient: sells whenever some v >= s) with
# r* = 130,000. With x = (v - 80,000) / 80,000, the top value has CDF
# x^n; everything below is exact (fractions), in yuan.
# no-sale probability = t^n, t = (r - L) / W
# lost surplus (efficiency) = E[(v_max - s) 1{s <= v_max < r*}]
# buyers' loss = seller gain + lost surplus
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
L, W, S, R = 80000, 80000, 100000, 130000
a, b = Fr(S - L, W), Fr(R - L, W)
def payoff(n, t):
rev0 = Fr(n - 1, n + 1) + t ** n - Fr(2 * n, n + 1) * t ** (n + 1)
return L * (1 - t ** n) + W * rev0 + S * t ** n
def lost(n):
return ((L - S) * (b ** n - a ** n)
+ W * Fr(n, n + 1) * (b ** (n + 1) - a ** (n + 1)))
print("n P(no sale) r=s P(no sale) r* seller gain lost surplus"
" buyers lose")
for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8):
g = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a)
ls = lost(n)
print("%d %.4f %.4f %8.0f %8.0f %8.0f"
% (n, float(a ** n), float(b ** n), float(g), float(ls),
float(g + ls)))
n = 3
g, ls = payoff(n, b) - payoff(n, a), lost(n)
print("n = 3: every 1 yuan the house gains costs buyers %.3f yuan"
% float((g + ls) / g))
print("n = 3: gain %s yuan, lost surplus %s yuan (exact)" % (g, ls))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《维克里二价暗标、迈尔森最优保留价与孤品奢包限量席位激励相容拍卖母典》第 3 章「保留价的账单:流拍、被放弃的成交与看错分布」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-237 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026237,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Vickrey Second-Price Sealed Bids and Myerson Optimal Reserve Prices: Incentive-Compatible Auctions for One-of-a-Kind Luxury Pieces and Limited Seats},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}