What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does”?
Answer: Nash's axiomatic bargaining solution maximises \((x_1 - d_1){\alpha}(x_2 - d_2){1-\alpha}\); Rubinstein's alternating-offers model gives \(x_1^* = (1 - \delta_2)/(1 - \delta_1\delta_2)\), so patience is bargaining power. As the interval between offers goes to zero the two coincide, with the Nash weight set by relative patience. A BATNA sets your bottom line, but whether it raises your share depends on the structure of the negotiation: as a Nash threat point it matters continuously; as an outside option in alternating offers it matters only when it exceeds the share you would get anyway; payoffs earned during the negotiation are what move shares continuously, like a threat point. The next chapter turns to another kind of information problem: one side knows the quality of the goods and the other does not.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
| Nash d=(0, 0) a | 0.5: x1 = 0.5000; formula 0.5000 |
| Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a | 0.5: x1 = 0.6000; formula 0.6000 |
| Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a | 0.7: x1 = 0.7200; formula 0.7200 |
| Rubinstein delta=(0.9, 0.9): x1 | 0.5263; backward induction 0.5263 |
| Rubinstein delta=(0.95, 0.8): x1 | 0.8333; backward induction 0.8333 |
| Rubinstein delta=(0.8, 0.95): x1 | 0.2083; backward induction 0.2083 |
| r1 | 0.05, r2 = 0.15 per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = 0.7500 |
| an offer every | 7 days: player 1 gets 0.8628 |
| an offer every | 1 days: player 1 gets 0.7684 |
| an offer every | 0.1 days: player 1 gets 0.7519 |
| an offer every 0.01 days: player 1 gets 0.7502 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# (a) Asymmetric Nash: maximise (x - d1)^a (1 - x - d2)^(1-a) => x* = d1 + a(1-d1-d2).
# (b) Rubinstein, player 1 proposes first: x1* = (1 - delta2) / (1 - delta1 delta2); check
# against 400 rounds of backward induction. (c) delta_i = exp(-r_i dt), dt -> 0.
import math
def nash(d1, d2, a, steps=100000):
xs = [d1 + (1 - d1 - d2) * k / steps for k in range(1, steps)]
return max(xs, key=lambda x: a * math.log(x - d1) + (1 - a) * math.log(1 - x - d2))
for d1, d2, a in ((0, 0, .5), (.3, .1, .5), (.3, .1, .7)):
print(f"Nash d=({d1}, {d2}) a={a}: x1 = {nash(d1, d2, a):.4f}; formula "
f"{d1 + a * (1 - d1 - d2):.4f}")
def backward(dl1, dl2, rounds=400): # the last proposer (player 2) takes everything
share = 1.0
for k in range(rounds - 1): # proposer offers the responder her continuation
share = 1 - (dl2 if k % 2 == 0 else dl1) * share
return share
for dl1, dl2 in ((.9, .9), (.95, .8), (.8, .95)):
print(f"Rubinstein delta=({dl1}, {dl2}): x1 = {(1 - dl2) / (1 - dl1 * dl2):.4f};"
f" backward induction {backward(dl1, dl2):.4f}")
r1, r2 = 0.05, 0.15
print(f"r1 = {r1}, r2 = {r2} per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = {r2 / (r1 + r2):.4f}")
for dt in (7, 1, 0.1, 0.01):
a, b = math.exp(-r1 * dt), math.exp(-r2 * dt)
print(f" an offer every {dt:>4} days: player 1 gets {(1 - b) / (1 - a * b):.4f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
- Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
- Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
- Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial