What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does”?

Answer: Nash's axiomatic bargaining solution maximises \((x_1 - d_1){\alpha}(x_2 - d_2){1-\alpha}\); Rubinstein's alternating-offers model gives \(x_1^* = (1 - \delta_2)/(1 - \delta_1\delta_2)\), so patience is bargaining power. As the interval between offers goes to zero the two coincide, with the Nash weight set by relative patience. A BATNA sets your bottom line, but whether it raises your share depends on the structure of the negotiation: as a Nash threat point it matters continuously; as an outside option in alternating offers it matters only when it exceeds the share you would get anyway; payoffs earned during the negotiation are what move shares continuously, like a threat point. The next chapter turns to another kind of information problem: one side knows the quality of the goods and the other does not.

Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only

Nash d=(0, 0) a0.5: x1 = 0.5000; formula 0.5000
Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a0.5: x1 = 0.6000; formula 0.6000
Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a0.7: x1 = 0.7200; formula 0.7200
Rubinstein delta=(0.9, 0.9): x10.5263; backward induction 0.5263
Rubinstein delta=(0.95, 0.8): x10.8333; backward induction 0.8333
Rubinstein delta=(0.8, 0.95): x10.2083; backward induction 0.2083
r10.05, r2 = 0.15 per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = 0.7500
an offer every7 days: player 1 gets 0.8628
an offer every1 days: player 1 gets 0.7684
an offer every0.1 days: player 1 gets 0.7519
an offer every 0.01 days: player 1 gets 0.7502

Key formula

\[x_1^* = \frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}.\]
Show the full program
# (a) Asymmetric Nash: maximise (x - d1)^a (1 - x - d2)^(1-a) => x* = d1 + a(1-d1-d2).
# (b) Rubinstein, player 1 proposes first: x1* = (1 - delta2) / (1 - delta1 delta2); check
#     against 400 rounds of backward induction. (c) delta_i = exp(-r_i dt), dt -> 0.
import math

def nash(d1, d2, a, steps=100000):
    xs = [d1 + (1 - d1 - d2) * k / steps for k in range(1, steps)]
    return max(xs, key=lambda x: a * math.log(x - d1) + (1 - a) * math.log(1 - x - d2))

for d1, d2, a in ((0, 0, .5), (.3, .1, .5), (.3, .1, .7)):
    print(f"Nash d=({d1}, {d2}) a={a}: x1 = {nash(d1, d2, a):.4f}; formula "
          f"{d1 + a * (1 - d1 - d2):.4f}")

def backward(dl1, dl2, rounds=400):    # the last proposer (player 2) takes everything
    share = 1.0
    for k in range(rounds - 1):        # proposer offers the responder her continuation
        share = 1 - (dl2 if k % 2 == 0 else dl1) * share
    return share

for dl1, dl2 in ((.9, .9), (.95, .8), (.8, .95)):
    print(f"Rubinstein delta=({dl1}, {dl2}): x1 = {(1 - dl2) / (1 - dl1 * dl2):.4f};"
          f" backward induction {backward(dl1, dl2):.4f}")
r1, r2 = 0.05, 0.15
print(f"r1 = {r1}, r2 = {r2} per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = {r2 / (r1 + r2):.4f}")
for dt in (7, 1, 0.1, 0.01):
    a, b = math.exp(-r1 * dt), math.exp(-r2 * dt)
    print(f"  an offer every {dt:>4} days: player 1 gets {(1 - b) / (1 - a * b):.4f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}

Other chapter answers in this book