关于「议价:纳什、鲁宾斯坦与 BATNA 的真正作用」,《机制设计与谈判博弈》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:纳什的公理化议价解最大化 \((x_1 - d_1){\alpha}(x_2 - d_2){1-\alpha}\);鲁宾斯坦的轮流出价模型给出 \(x_1^* = (1 - \delta_2)/(1 - \delta_1\delta_2)\),耐心就是议价力量。当出价间隔趋于零时,两者重合,纳什权重由相对耐心决定。BATNA 决定了你的底线,但它是否提高你的份额取决于谈判的结构:作为纳什威胁点,它持续起作用;作为轮流出价中的外部选择,它只有在高于你本来就能得到的份额时才起作用;谈判期间的内部收益才像威胁点一样持续改变份额。下一章讨论另一类信息问题:一方知道商品的质量,另一方不知道。

数据口径:本书不是法律意见;拍卖串通、围标等违法行为只作为机制弱点讨论,不提供操作方法。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库

Nash d=(0, 0) a0.5: x1 = 0.5000; formula 0.5000
Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a0.5: x1 = 0.6000; formula 0.6000
Nash d=(0.3, 0.1) a0.7: x1 = 0.7200; formula 0.7200
Rubinstein delta=(0.9, 0.9): x10.5263; backward induction 0.5263
Rubinstein delta=(0.95, 0.8): x10.8333; backward induction 0.8333
Rubinstein delta=(0.8, 0.95): x10.2083; backward induction 0.2083
r10.05, r2 = 0.15 per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = 0.7500
an offer every7 days: player 1 gets 0.8628
an offer every1 days: player 1 gets 0.7684
an offer every0.1 days: player 1 gets 0.7519
an offer every 0.01 days: player 1 gets 0.7502

核心公式

\[x_1^* = \frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}.\]
查看完整验算程序
# (a) Asymmetric Nash: maximise (x - d1)^a (1 - x - d2)^(1-a) => x* = d1 + a(1-d1-d2).
# (b) Rubinstein, player 1 proposes first: x1* = (1 - delta2) / (1 - delta1 delta2); check
#     against 400 rounds of backward induction. (c) delta_i = exp(-r_i dt), dt -> 0.
import math

def nash(d1, d2, a, steps=100000):
    xs = [d1 + (1 - d1 - d2) * k / steps for k in range(1, steps)]
    return max(xs, key=lambda x: a * math.log(x - d1) + (1 - a) * math.log(1 - x - d2))

for d1, d2, a in ((0, 0, .5), (.3, .1, .5), (.3, .1, .7)):
    print(f"Nash d=({d1}, {d2}) a={a}: x1 = {nash(d1, d2, a):.4f}; formula "
          f"{d1 + a * (1 - d1 - d2):.4f}")

def backward(dl1, dl2, rounds=400):    # the last proposer (player 2) takes everything
    share = 1.0
    for k in range(rounds - 1):        # proposer offers the responder her continuation
        share = 1 - (dl2 if k % 2 == 0 else dl1) * share
    return share

for dl1, dl2 in ((.9, .9), (.95, .8), (.8, .95)):
    print(f"Rubinstein delta=({dl1}, {dl2}): x1 = {(1 - dl2) / (1 - dl1 * dl2):.4f};"
          f" backward induction {backward(dl1, dl2):.4f}")
r1, r2 = 0.05, 0.15
print(f"r1 = {r1}, r2 = {r2} per day; Nash weight r2/(r1+r2) = {r2 / (r1 + r2):.4f}")
for dt in (7, 1, 0.1, 0.01):
    a, b = math.exp(-r1 * dt), math.exp(-r2 * dt)
    print(f"  an offer every {dt:>4} days: player 1 gets {(1 - b) / (1 - a * b):.4f}")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《机制设计、激励相容与谈判博弈的数学模型》第 4 章「议价:纳什、鲁宾斯坦与 BATNA 的真正作用」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}

本书其他章节结论