关于「迈尔森—萨特思韦特不可能性定理」,《机制设计与谈判博弈》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:迈尔森—萨特思韦特定理说明,当买卖双方都有私人信息、估值区间重叠时,没有任何机制能同时做到贝叶斯激励相容、中期个人理性、事后有效与预算平衡。在均匀分布的例子中,最好的机制只在 \(v \ge c + 1/4\) 时成交,实现最优交易收益的 \(9/64 \div 1/6 = 84.375\%\);查特吉—萨缪尔森双边拍卖的线性均衡恰好达到这个上限,但该拍卖还有许多更差的均衡。效率损失来自信息结构,而不是来自技巧不足;缩小损失的办法是让信息可核查、引入竞争或由外部承担赤字。下一章离开机制,讨论两个人面对面讨价还价时的分配。

数据口径:本书不是法律意见;拍卖串通、围标等违法行为只作为机制弱点讨论,不提供操作方法。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 64, 84.375

trade iff v > c: gains 0.16667 (1/6), virtual surplus -0.16667: infeasible
smallest feasible t0.25000; gains 0.140625 (9/64 = 0.140625), 84.375% of first-best
best replies (formula): buyer v0.4: 0.350 (0.350) v=0.7: 0.550 (0.550) v=1: 0.750 (0.750)
seller c0: 0.250 (0.250) c=0.3: 0.450 (0.450) c=0.6: 0.650 (0.650)

核心公式

\[\mathbb{E}\big[\,\big((2v - 1) - 2c\big)\cdot \mathbf{1}\{\text{成交}\}\big],\]
查看完整验算程序
# Bilateral trade, v and c independent uniform on [0, 1]; d = v - c has density 1 - d on
# [0, 1]. For the rule "trade iff d >= t": gains = int_t^1 d(1-d), and expected virtual
# surplus = int_t^1 (2d - 1)(1 - d), which must be >= 0 for a BIC, interim IR, budget-
# balanced mechanism (Myerson-Satterthwaite). Then check the Chatterjee-Samuelson
# linear equilibrium: ask 2c/3 + 1/4, bid 2v/3 + 1/12, price = average when bid >= ask.
def integrals(t, steps=200000):
    h = (1 - t) / steps
    ds = [t + (k + 0.5) * h for k in range(steps)]
    return sum(d * (1 - d) for d in ds) * h, sum((2 * d - 1) * (1 - d) for d in ds) * h

s0, vs0 = integrals(0.0)
print(f"trade iff v > c: gains {s0:.5f} (1/6), virtual surplus {vs0:+.5f}: infeasible")
lo, hi = 0.0, 0.5
for _ in range(40):
    mid = (lo + hi) / 2
    lo, hi = (mid, hi) if integrals(mid, 20000)[1] < 0 else (lo, mid)
s1 = integrals(hi)[0]
print(f"smallest feasible t = {hi:.5f}; gains {s1:.6f} (9/64 = {9 / 64:.6f}),"
      f" {s1 / s0:.3%} of first-best")
pts = [(i + 0.5) / 1000 for i in range(1000)]
ask, bid = (lambda c: 2 * c / 3 + 0.25), (lambda v: 2 * v / 3 + 1 / 12)
offers = [k / 500 for k in range(501)]
def by(v):                      # buyer's best bid against the seller's linear ask
    return max(offers, key=lambda b: sum(v - (b + ask(c)) / 2
                                         for c in pts if b >= ask(c)))
def se(c):                      # seller's best ask against the buyer's linear bid
    return max(offers, key=lambda a: sum((a + bid(v)) / 2 - c
                                         for v in pts if bid(v) >= a))
print("best replies (formula): buyer " +
      " ".join(f"v={v}: {by(v):.3f} ({bid(v):.3f})" for v in (.4, .7, 1)))
print("                       seller " +
      " ".join(f"c={c}: {se(c):.3f} ({ask(c):.3f})" for c in (0, .3, .6)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《机制设计、激励相容与谈判博弈的数学模型》第 3 章「迈尔森—萨特思韦特不可能性定理」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}

本书其他章节结论