What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem”?
Answer: The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem shows that when buyer and seller both hold private information and their value ranges overlap, no mechanism can be at once Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational, ex post efficient and budget balanced. In the uniform example, the best mechanism trades only when \(v \ge c + 1/4\), realising \(9/64 \div 1/6 = 84.375\,\%\) of the first-best gains; the linear equilibrium of the Chatterjee–Samuelson double auction attains this bound exactly, though the auction also has many worse equilibria. The loss of efficiency comes from the information structure, not from a lack of skill; the ways to reduce it are to make information verifiable, to bring in competition, or to have an outsider bear the deficit. The next chapter leaves mechanisms behind and turns to how two people facing each other divide a surplus.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 64, 84.375
| trade iff v > c: gains 0.16667 (1/6), virtual surplus -0.16667: infeasible | |
| smallest feasible t | 0.25000; gains 0.140625 (9/64 = 0.140625), 84.375% of first-best |
| best replies (formula): buyer v | 0.4: 0.350 (0.350) v=0.7: 0.550 (0.550) v=1: 0.750 (0.750) |
| seller c | 0: 0.250 (0.250) c=0.3: 0.450 (0.450) c=0.6: 0.650 (0.650) |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Bilateral trade, v and c independent uniform on [0, 1]; d = v - c has density 1 - d on
# [0, 1]. For the rule "trade iff d >= t": gains = int_t^1 d(1-d), and expected virtual
# surplus = int_t^1 (2d - 1)(1 - d), which must be >= 0 for a BIC, interim IR, budget-
# balanced mechanism (Myerson-Satterthwaite). Then check the Chatterjee-Samuelson
# linear equilibrium: ask 2c/3 + 1/4, bid 2v/3 + 1/12, price = average when bid >= ask.
def integrals(t, steps=200000):
h = (1 - t) / steps
ds = [t + (k + 0.5) * h for k in range(steps)]
return sum(d * (1 - d) for d in ds) * h, sum((2 * d - 1) * (1 - d) for d in ds) * h
s0, vs0 = integrals(0.0)
print(f"trade iff v > c: gains {s0:.5f} (1/6), virtual surplus {vs0:+.5f}: infeasible")
lo, hi = 0.0, 0.5
for _ in range(40):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
lo, hi = (mid, hi) if integrals(mid, 20000)[1] < 0 else (lo, mid)
s1 = integrals(hi)[0]
print(f"smallest feasible t = {hi:.5f}; gains {s1:.6f} (9/64 = {9 / 64:.6f}),"
f" {s1 / s0:.3%} of first-best")
pts = [(i + 0.5) / 1000 for i in range(1000)]
ask, bid = (lambda c: 2 * c / 3 + 0.25), (lambda v: 2 * v / 3 + 1 / 12)
offers = [k / 500 for k in range(501)]
def by(v): # buyer's best bid against the seller's linear ask
return max(offers, key=lambda b: sum(v - (b + ask(c)) / 2
for c in pts if b >= ask(c)))
def se(c): # seller's best ask against the buyer's linear bid
return max(offers, key=lambda a: sum((a + bid(v)) / 2 - c
for v in pts if bid(v) >= a))
print("best replies (formula): buyer " +
" ".join(f"v={v}: {by(v):.3f} ({bid(v):.3f})" for v in (.4, .7, 1)))
print(" seller " +
" ".join(f"c={c}: {se(c):.3f} ({ask(c):.3f})" for c in (0, .3, .6)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
- Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
- Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
- Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial