What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle”?

Answer: The result shows three properties of the mechanism. First, the cutter cuts truthfully according to her own preferences (at 0.362) and gets exactly half in her own eyes; the chooser gets 0.777 in his eyes, and neither envies the other. Second, what it guarantees is only one half; it does not guarantee a "fair share" of the surplus. If the cutter knows the chooser's preferences, she moves the knife to the point where he is just indifferent (0.638), keeping 0.777 for herself and leaving him only 0.501: still envy-free, but the gains all go to the cutter. This is exactly the information problem that mechanism design cares about: the outcome of a rule depends on who knows what. Third, it is not necessarily efficient: the sum of the two valuations could reach 1.300 (cut in the middle, each taking the preferred end), whereas cut and choose yields 1.277.

Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.362, 0.501, 0.638, 0.777, 1.277, 1.300

honest cut at 0.362: cutter gets 0.500 (other piece 0.500 to her); chooser 0.777
informed cutter cuts at 0.638: she gets 0.777, chooser 0.501
sum of values: honest 1.277, informed 1.277, best split 1.300
Show the full program
# "I cut, you choose" on a cake [0, 1]. Cutter's density f(x) = 1.6 - 1.2x (likes the left
# end); chooser's g(x) = 0.4 + 1.2x (likes the right end); each values the cake at 1.
f = lambda x: 1.6 - 1.2 * x
g = lambda x: 0.4 + 1.2 * x

def value(dens, a, b, steps=4000):                 # midpoint-rule integral
    h = (b - a) / steps
    return sum(dens(a + (k + 0.5) * h) for k in range(steps)) * h

def play(cut):                                     # chooser takes the piece he prefers
    takes_right = value(g, cut, 1) >= value(g, 0, cut)
    cutter = value(f, 0, cut) if takes_right else value(f, cut, 1)
    return cutter, max(value(g, 0, cut), value(g, cut, 1))

lo, hi = 0.0, 1.0                                  # honest cut: halves equal for HER
for _ in range(50):
    mid = (lo + hi) / 2
    lo, hi = (mid, hi) if value(f, 0, mid) < 0.5 else (lo, mid)
cg, hg = play(hi)
print(f"honest cut at {hi:.3f}: cutter gets {cg:.3f} (other piece {1 - cg:.3f} to her);"
      f" chooser {hg:.3f}")
# An informed cutter moves the knife to the chooser's indifference point.
cuts = [k / 1000 for k in range(1, 1000)]
k = max((c for c in cuts if value(g, c, 1) >= value(g, 0, c)), key=lambda c: play(c)[0])
ci, hi2 = play(k)
print(f"informed cutter cuts at {k:.3f}: she gets {ci:.3f}, chooser {hi2:.3f}")
print(f"sum of values: honest {cg + hg:.3f}, informed {ci + hi2:.3f}, "
      f"best split {value(f, 0, 0.5) + value(g, 0.5, 1):.3f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}

Other chapter answers in this book