Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation: chapter answers
A negotiation ends with both sides satisfied, yet a large piece of value is often left on the table; a reasonable-looking performance metric produces beautiful numbers and a worse business a year later. This book uses mechanism design, auction theory, bargaining theory and the economics of information to examine how rules themselves shape behaviour, and where even good rules meet unavoidable limits. It covers mechanism design as "reverse game theory" and the revelation principle; the envy-freeness of "I cut, you choose" (which guarantees each person only half, with the outcome depending on wh…
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
The result shows three properties of the mechanism. First, the cutter cuts truthfully according to her own preferences (at 0.362) and gets exactly half in her own eyes; the chooser gets 0.777 in his eyes, and neither en… - Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
The second-price auction makes the winner pay the second-highest bid, so that one's own bid determines only whether one wins, not the price; truthful bidding is therefore weakly dominant, as the program verified across… - Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem shows that when buyer and seller both hold private information and their value ranges overlap, no mechanism can be at once Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational,… - Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
Nash's axiomatic bargaining solution maximises $(x_1 - d_1)^{\alpha}(x_2 - d_2){1-\alpha}$; Rubinstein's alternating-offers model gives $x_1^* = (1 - \delta_2)/(1 - \delta_1\delta_2)$, so patience is bargaining power. A… - Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
With $k = 1.5$ the price is multiplied by 0.75 each round: from 1.00 to 0.75, 0.56, 0.42…; after 17 rounds fewer than 1 % of cars remain on the market. With $k = 1.9$ the shrinking is much slower, but it still takes abo… - Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target
Goodhart's 1975 wording was "any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes"; the popular "when a measure becomes a target" comes from Strathern in 1997; C… - Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial
With a smallest effect of interest of 0.35 standard deviations and 90 % power, each arm needs 173 analysable dyads; allowing for about 10 % of dyads being unusable because one member fails to appear or the protocol is b…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote