What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target”?
Answer: Goodhart's 1975 wording was "any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes"; the popular "when a measure becomes a target" comes from Strathern in 1997; Campbell in 1979 stressed that indicators corrupt the process they measure. A selection model shows that as long as gaming is cheaper than real improvement and people differ in their talent for gaming, the higher the bonus, the worse the metric becomes at telling people apart. The main value of random audits is that they allow steeper incentives; audits that announce which route they check merely shift gaming, while unannounced random audits can suppress several routes at once, though they may add risk and crowd out unmeasured effort. The next chapter reads these modern results beside ancient Chinese debates on reward, punishment, names and reality.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
| b | | mean V | mean M | corr(M, V) | top 10 % by M also top by V | gaming cost | ||||||||
| 0.0 | -0.01 | | -0.01 | | | 0.89 | | | 67.4% | | | 0.00 | ||
| 0.5 | | 0.49 | | | 0.99 | | | 0.87 | | | 63.5% | | | 0.12 |
| 1.0 | | 0.99 | | | 1.99 | | | 0.80 | | | 55.5% | | | 0.50 |
| 2.0 | | 1.99 | | | 3.99 | | | 0.67 | | | 43.3% | | | 1.99 |
| 4.0 | | 4.00 | | | 7.99 | | | 0.54 | | | 35.0% | | | 7.98 |
Show the full program
# Goodhart as selection. 20,000 staff: true baseline s ~ N(0, 1), talent for real work
# a ~ U(0.5, 1.5), talent for gaming k ~ U(0, 2), independent (illustrative). Pay b per
# metric point; with costs t^2/(2a) and g^2/(2k) each picks t = b a and g = b k.
# True value V = s + t; metric M = s + t + g + noise (sd 0.5).
import random, statistics as st
rng = random.Random(5)
staff = [(rng.gauss(0, 1), rng.uniform(0.5, 1.5), rng.uniform(0, 2), rng.gauss(0, 0.5))
for _ in range(20000)]
def top(xs, q=0.10):
return set(sorted(range(len(xs)), key=lambda i: -xs[i])[:int(len(xs) * q)])
def world(b):
V = [s + b * a for s, a, k, e in staff]
M = [s + b * a + b * k + e for s, a, k, e in staff]
burned = st.mean(b * b * k / 2 for _, _, k, _ in staff) # cost spent on gaming
overlap = len(top(M) & top(V)) / (len(V) // 10)
return st.mean(V), st.mean(M), st.correlation(M, V), overlap, burned
print(" b | mean V | mean M | corr(M, V) | top 10 % by M also top by V | gaming cost")
for b in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0):
mv, mm, r, ov, gc = world(b)
print(f" {b:3.1f} | {mv:5.2f} | {mm:5.2f} | {r:.2f} |"
f" {ov:5.1%} | {gc:5.2f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
- Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
- Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
- Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial