What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Practice and a Pre-registered Trial”?
Answer: With a smallest effect of interest of 0.35 standard deviations and 90 % power, each arm needs 173 analysable dyads; allowing for about 10 % of dyads being unusable because one member fails to appear or the protocol is breached, each arm randomises 193 dyads, 386 dyads and 772 people in all. If the true effect were only 0.25 standard deviations, each arm would need 338 dyads; this trial does not aim to detect an effect that small.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.25, 0.35, 10, 173, 193, 338
| effect (SD) | dyads per arm, 80 % power | 90 % power | ||||
| 0.25 | | | 253 | | | 338 |
| 0.30 | | | 176 | | | 235 |
| 0.35 | | | 130 | | | 173 |
| 0.40 | | | 100 | | | 133 |
| 0.50 | | | 64 | | | 86 |
| chosen: 0.35 SD, 90 % power -> 173 analysable dyads per arm | ||||
| allowing 10 % unusable dyads: randomise 193 per arm, 386 dyads, 772 people |
Show the full program
# Sample size, dyad-randomised trial; unit = dyad, both members in the same arm.
# A: 10-minute structured preparation form; B: 10 minutes of standard negotiation tips.
# Primary outcome: joint points (impasse = sum of BATNAs), effect in SD units.
# Two-sided alpha 0.05; normal approximation, + 1 per arm.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist
z = NormalDist().inv_cdf
def per_arm(d, power=0.90, alpha=0.05):
return math.ceil(2 * (z(1 - alpha / 2) + z(power)) ** 2 / d ** 2) + 1
print(" effect (SD) | dyads per arm, 80 % power | 90 % power")
for d in (0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.50):
print(f" {d:.2f} | {per_arm(d, 0.80):4d} |"
f" {per_arm(d):4d}")
n = per_arm(0.35)
recruit = math.ceil(n / 0.90)
print(f"chosen: 0.35 SD, 90 % power -> {n} analysable dyads per arm")
print(f"allowing 10 % unusable dyads: randomise {recruit} per arm, {2 * recruit} dyads,"
f" {4 * recruit} people")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Practice and a Pre-registered Trial. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
- Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
- Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
- Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
- Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target