What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG”?
Answer: The second-price auction makes the winner pay the second-highest bid, so that one's own bid determines only whether one wins, not the price; truthful bidding is therefore weakly dominant, as the program verified across more than a million combinations. Laboratory subjects nevertheless often overbid. In the first-price auction, shading is an equilibrium strategy that can be derived: with \(n\) bidders and independent uniform private values, \(b(v) = (n-1)v/n\); laboratory bids are often above this risk-neutral benchmark. Revenue equivalence means that first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions yield the same expected revenue, though with different risk. In theory VCG achieves truthful reporting and efficient allocation; in practice it can yield very low revenue, revenue that falls as bidders are added, and is fragile against coordination among losers and false identities. The next chapter asks how hard things become when both buyer and seller hold private information.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it.
| 1,030,301 (value, bid, rival) cases; truthful bid worse | 0 times |
| untruthful (value, bid) pairs that lose strictly to some rival bid | 10,100 |
| v | 0.60; payoff when the best rival bid is 0.30 / 0.50 / 0.70 / 0.90: |
| bid 0.40: +0.30 +0.00 +0.00 +0.00 | |
| bid 0.60: +0.30 +0.10 +0.00 +0.00 | |
| bid 0.80: +0.30 +0.10 | -0.10 +0.00 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Second-price auction: highest bid wins, pays the best rival bid r (ties split).
# Check on a grid: bidding one's value v is never worse than any other bid b, for any r.
GRID = [round(k * 0.01, 2) for k in range(101)]
def payoff(v, b, r):
return v - r if b > r else (v - r) / 2 if b == r else 0.0
worse, strict = 0, 0
for v in GRID:
for b in GRID:
d = [payoff(v, v, r) - payoff(v, b, r) for r in GRID]
worse += sum(x < -1e-12 for x in d)
strict += b != v and any(x > 1e-12 for x in d)
print(f"{len(GRID) ** 3:,} (value, bid, rival) cases; truthful bid worse: {worse} times")
print(f"untruthful (value, bid) pairs that lose strictly to some rival bid: {strict:,}")
print("v = 0.60; payoff when the best rival bid is 0.30 / 0.50 / 0.70 / 0.90:")
for b in (0.40, 0.60, 0.80):
row = " ".join(f"{payoff(0.6, b, r):+.2f}" for r in (.3, .5, .7, .9))
print(f" bid {b:.2f}: {row}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
- Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
- Chapter 5 · Lemons and Costly Signals
- Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial