What does Mechanism Design and Negotiation conclude, in numbers, about “Lemons and Costly Signals”?
Answer: With \(k = 1.5\) the price is multiplied by 0.75 each round: from 1.00 to 0.75, 0.56, 0.42…; after 17 rounds fewer than 1 % of cars remain on the market. With \(k = 1.9\) the shrinking is much slower, but it still takes about 90 rounds to fall below 1 %: as long as \(k < 2\), the spiral ends at zero. With \(k = 2.5\) the buyers' premium for quality is high enough: at a price of 1 the average quality on offer is 0.5, and 0.5 times 2.5 is 1.25, still above the top quality, so the market does not shrink at all.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal advice; bid rigging, collusive tendering and other unlawful practices are discussed only as weaknesses of mechanisms, and no method for them is given. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.42, 0.56, 0.75, 1.00, 1.5, 1.9
| k | 1.5: 1.00 -> 0.75 -> 0.56 -> 0.42 -> 0.32 -> 0.24 ...; under 1 % left after 17 rounds |
| k | 1.9: 1.00 -> 0.95 -> 0.90 -> 0.86 -> 0.81 -> 0.77 ...; under 1 % left after 90 rounds |
| k | 2.5: 1.00 -> 1.00 -> 1.00 -> 1.00 -> 1.00 -> 1.00 ...; no unravelling |
| k | 1.5: full-information gains 0.250 per car; hidden quality: 0 |
| kappa | certify if q >= | traded | net gains | spent on certificates | |
| 0.02 | | 0.04 | 96% | 0.230 | 0.019 |
| 0.05 | | 0.10 | 90% | 0.202 | 0.045 |
| 0.10 | | 0.20 | 80% | 0.160 | 0.080 |
| 0.20 | | 0.40 | 60% | 0.090 | 0.120 |
Show the full program
# Lemons: quality q ~ U[0, 1], known only to the seller, who wants at least q; a buyer
# values q at k*q. At price p only q <= p is offered (mean p/2), so buyers then pay k*p/2.
for k in (1.5, 1.9, 2.5):
path = [1.0]
for _ in range(200):
path.append(min(1.0, k * path[-1] / 2))
n = next((i for i, x in enumerate(path) if x < 0.01), None)
end = f"under 1 % left after {n} rounds" if n else "no unravelling"
print(f"k = {k}: " + " -> ".join(f"{x:.2f}" for x in path[:6]) + f" ...; {end}")
# Certification at cost kappa reveals q; certified cars sell at k*q. Uncertified cars
# still spiral (k < 2) and do not trade, so a seller certifies iff k*q - kappa >= q.
k = 1.5
print(f"k = {k}: full-information gains {(k - 1) / 2:.3f} per car; hidden quality: 0")
print(" kappa | certify if q >= | traded | net gains | spent on certificates")
for kappa in (0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20):
qs = kappa / (k - 1)
spent = kappa * (1 - qs)
net = (k - 1) * (1 - qs ** 2) / 2 - spent
print(f" {kappa:.2f} | {qs:.2f} | {1 - qs:4.0%} | {net:.3f} |"
f" {spent:.3f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Lemons and Costly Signals. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765012 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-027 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026027,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Incentive Compatibility and the Game Theory of Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765012},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765012}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Reverse Game Theory: Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 2 · Auctions: Vickrey, Revenue Equivalence and the Loneliness of VCG
- Chapter 3 · The Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
- Chapter 4 · Bargaining: Nash, Rubinstein and What a BATNA Really Does
- Chapter 6 · Goodhart's Law: When a Measure Becomes a Target
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial