What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives the commitment ledger, the distilled Anti-Hold-Up Collateral and Reneging Threshold Calculator, checker specification tables and a pre-registered test needing 199 deals per group. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 199
| order kind price referrer rate share rule_tag ok | |
| o1 item | 49 u7 0.50 24.5 3b5dfa5861d7 True |
| o2 item | 199 u7 0.30 59.7 3b5dfa5861d7 True |
| o3 seat | 2400 u3 0.15 360.0 3b5dfa5861d7 True |
| o4 item | 99 - 0.00 0.0 3b5dfa5861d7 True |
| o5 item | 120 u3 0.30 36.0 3b5dfa5861d7 True |
| total share paid | 480.2; tiers paid per order: 1 at most |
| payout recomputed under a later rule text accepted: False | |
| seat from 2026-03-15 clears on 2027-03-15 | |
| seat from 2026-01-31 clears on 2027-01-31 | |
| seat from 2028-02-29 clears on 2029-02-28 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p82: is a referral and seat rule time-consistent?
# Public rule written ex ante (illustrative rates, unit-free prices):
# - a referral share goes to the direct referrer only (one tier);
# - the rate is set by the price band of the item bought:
# price <= 99 -> 0.50, price >= 100 -> 0.30, seat or licence -> 0.15
# - a seat runs 12 months from activation, then clears; one account.
# Each order stores the hash of the rule text in force when it was
# placed. A payout computed under any other rule text is flagged, so a
# rule cannot be rewritten after the results are known.
import datetime
import hashlib
from fractions import Fraction as F
RULE_V1 = "one-tier;<=99:0.50;>=100:0.30;seat:0.15;seat=12m"
RULE_V2 = "one-tier;<=99:0.40;>=100:0.20;seat:0.10;seat=12m"
def tag(text):
return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("ascii")).hexdigest()[:12]
def rate(kind, price):
if kind == "seat":
return F(15, 100)
return F(50, 100) if price <= 99 else F(30, 100)
def add_months(d, m):
y, mo = divmod(d.month - 1 + m, 12)
y, mo = d.year + y, mo + 1
for day in (d.day, 30, 29, 28):
try:
return datetime.date(y, mo, day)
except ValueError:
continue
ORDERS = [("o1", "item", 49, "u7", RULE_V1),
("o2", "item", 199, "u7", RULE_V1),
("o3", "seat", 2400, "u3", RULE_V1),
("o4", "item", 99, None, RULE_V1),
("o5", "item", 120, "u3", RULE_V1)]
paid = F(0)
print("order kind price referrer rate share rule_tag ok")
for oid, kind, price, ref, rule in ORDERS:
r = rate(kind, price) if ref else F(0)
share = r * price
paid += share
ok = tag(rule) == tag(RULE_V1)
print("{:<5} {:<4} {:>5} {:<8} {:<5.2f} {:>6.1f} {} {}".format(
oid, kind, price, ref or "-", float(r), float(share),
tag(rule), ok))
print("total share paid: {:.1f}; tiers paid per order: 1 at most".format(
float(paid)))
late = tag(RULE_V2) == tag(RULE_V1)
print("payout recomputed under a later rule text accepted:", late)
for start in (datetime.date(2026, 3, 15), datetime.date(2026, 1, 31),
datetime.date(2028, 2, 29)):
print("seat from {} clears on {}".format(start, add_months(start, 12)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword