What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits”?
Answer: Present bias makes one person choose differently at different dates. Hyperbolic discounting reverses the preference at 5.00 days; quasi-hyperbolic discounting reverses it the moment the smaller reward lands today. Sophisticated agents, who know they will delay, lose far less than naive ones; a forfeitable deposit can restrain the present self, but it has both a lower and an upper bound, and once the accident probability exceeds 0.667 no deposit is worth taking.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 5.00
| days_ahead | exponential | hyperbolic | beta_delta |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | LL | SS | SS |
| 1 | LL | SS | LL |
| 2 | LL | SS | LL |
| 4 | LL | SS | LL |
| 5 | LL | SS | LL |
| 6 | LL | LL | LL |
| 10 | LL | LL | LL |
| 30 | LL | LL | LL |
| hyperbolic switch point t* = 5.00 days | |||
| exponential: B d^D / A = 1.2881 at every t | |||
| beta-delta at t=0: b d^D B / A = 0.8559 | |||
| beta-delta at t>=1: d^D B / A = 1.4265 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: preference reversal under three discount functions
# Smaller-sooner reward A at day t, larger-later B at day t + D.
# exponential w(t) = d^t (Strotz: no reversal)
# hyperbolic w(t) = 1 / (1 + h t) (Ainslie)
# quasi-hyper w(0) = 1, w(t) = b d^t for t >= 1 (Laibson beta-delta)
# For the hyperbolic case the later reward wins exactly when
# t > (A (1 + h D) - B) / (h (B - A)).
# Values illustrative, in unit-free reward units.
A, B, D = 100.0, 150.0, 5
DEX, H, BETA, DQ = 0.97, 0.2, 0.6, 0.99
def w_exp(t):
return DEX ** t
def w_hyp(t):
return 1.0 / (1.0 + H * t)
def w_qh(t):
return 1.0 if t == 0 else BETA * DQ ** t
def choice(w, t):
return "LL" if B * w(t + D) > A * w(t) else "SS"
print("days_ahead exponential hyperbolic beta_delta")
for t in (0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 30):
print("{:>10} {:>11} {:>10} {:>10}".format(
t, choice(w_exp, t), choice(w_hyp, t), choice(w_qh, t)))
tstar = (A * (1 + H * D) - B) / (H * (B - A))
print("hyperbolic switch point t* = {:.2f} days".format(tstar))
print("exponential: B d^D / A = {:.4f} at every t".format(B * DEX ** D / A))
print("beta-delta at t=0: b d^D B / A = {:.4f}".format(
BETA * DQ ** D * B / A))
print("beta-delta at t>=1: d^D B / A = {:.4f}".format(DQ ** D * B / A))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications