What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves”?

Answer: Chapter 1 uses the toy model of Kydland and Prescott to show that breach is most tempting in the period it happens, while lost credibility costs more in every period after; under grim trigger, reputation keeps the rule only when the discount factor exceeds 0.333.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.333

k lam pi_disc L_disc L_rule L_cheat gap tempt
10.52.0001.5000.5000.167 1.0000.333
11.01.0001.0000.5000.250 0.5000.250
12.00.5000.7500.5000.333 0.2500.167
14.00.2500.6250.5000.400 0.1250.100
20.54.0006.0002.0000.667 4.0001.333
21.02.0004.0002.0001.000 2.0001.000
22.01.0003.0002.0001.333 1.0000.667
24.00.5002.5002.0001.600 0.5000.400
check k=1 lam=1: gap = k^2/(2 lam) = 1/2 ; temptation = k^2/(2(1+lam)) = 1/4
ordering L_cheat < L_rule < L_disc holds: True
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: rules versus discretion in a Kydland-Prescott toy model
# Loss L = lam * pi^2 / 2 + (y - k)^2 / 2 with y = pi - pi_e.
# k is the planner's wish to push output above its natural level,
# lam the weight on inflation. Discretion: the planner optimises after
# expectations are set; rational expectations then force pi = k / lam.
# Rule: pi = 0 is announced and kept. Cheat: the rule is announced,
# believed (pi_e = 0) and then broken once. All values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F


def discretion(k, lam):
    pi = k / lam
    return pi, lam * pi * pi / 2 + k * k / 2


def rule(k, lam):
    return F(0), k * k / 2


def cheat(k, lam):
    pi = k / (1 + lam)
    y = pi
    return pi, lam * pi * pi / 2 + (y - k) ** 2 / 2


print("k    lam   pi_disc  L_disc  L_rule  L_cheat  gap   tempt")
for k in (F(1), F(2)):
    for lam in (F(1, 2), F(1), F(2), F(4)):
        pd, ld = discretion(k, lam)
        _, lr = rule(k, lam)
        _, lc = cheat(k, lam)
        fmt = "{:<4} {:<5} {:>7.3f} {:>7.3f} {:>7.3f} {:>8.3f} {:>5.3f}"
        print((fmt + " {:>6.3f}").format(
            str(k), float(lam), float(pd), float(ld), float(lr),
            float(lc), float(ld - lr), float(lr - lc)))
k, lam = F(1), F(1)
pd, ld = discretion(k, lam)
_, lr = rule(k, lam)
_, lc = cheat(k, lam)
print("check k=1 lam=1: gap = k^2/(2 lam) =", ld - lr,
      "; temptation = k^2/(2(1+lam)) =", lr - lc)
print("ordering L_cheat < L_rule < L_disc holds:", lc < lr < ld)

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book