What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves”?
Answer: Chapter 1 uses the toy model of Kydland and Prescott to show that breach is most tempting in the period it happens, while lost credibility costs more in every period after; under grim trigger, reputation keeps the rule only when the discount factor exceeds 0.333.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.333
| k lam pi_disc L_disc L_rule L_cheat gap tempt | ||||||
| 1 | 0.5 | 2.000 | 1.500 | 0.500 | 0.167 1.000 | 0.333 |
| 1 | 1.0 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.500 | 0.250 0.500 | 0.250 |
| 1 | 2.0 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 0.500 | 0.333 0.250 | 0.167 |
| 1 | 4.0 | 0.250 | 0.625 | 0.500 | 0.400 0.125 | 0.100 |
| 2 | 0.5 | 4.000 | 6.000 | 2.000 | 0.667 4.000 | 1.333 |
| 2 | 1.0 | 2.000 | 4.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 2.000 | 1.000 |
| 2 | 2.0 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 2.000 | 1.333 1.000 | 0.667 |
| 2 | 4.0 | 0.500 | 2.500 | 2.000 | 1.600 0.500 | 0.400 |
| check k=1 lam=1: gap = k^2/(2 lam) = 1/2 ; temptation = k^2/(2(1+lam)) = 1/4 | ||||||
| ordering L_cheat < L_rule < L_disc holds: True | ||||||
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: rules versus discretion in a Kydland-Prescott toy model
# Loss L = lam * pi^2 / 2 + (y - k)^2 / 2 with y = pi - pi_e.
# k is the planner's wish to push output above its natural level,
# lam the weight on inflation. Discretion: the planner optimises after
# expectations are set; rational expectations then force pi = k / lam.
# Rule: pi = 0 is announced and kept. Cheat: the rule is announced,
# believed (pi_e = 0) and then broken once. All values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
def discretion(k, lam):
pi = k / lam
return pi, lam * pi * pi / 2 + k * k / 2
def rule(k, lam):
return F(0), k * k / 2
def cheat(k, lam):
pi = k / (1 + lam)
y = pi
return pi, lam * pi * pi / 2 + (y - k) ** 2 / 2
print("k lam pi_disc L_disc L_rule L_cheat gap tempt")
for k in (F(1), F(2)):
for lam in (F(1, 2), F(1), F(2), F(4)):
pd, ld = discretion(k, lam)
_, lr = rule(k, lam)
_, lc = cheat(k, lam)
fmt = "{:<4} {:<5} {:>7.3f} {:>7.3f} {:>7.3f} {:>8.3f} {:>5.3f}"
print((fmt + " {:>6.3f}").format(
str(k), float(lam), float(pd), float(ld), float(lr),
float(lc), float(ld - lr), float(lr - lc)))
k, lam = F(1), F(1)
pd, ld = discretion(k, lam)
_, lr = rule(k, lam)
_, lc = cheat(k, lam)
print("check k=1 lam=1: gap = k^2/(2 lam) =", ld - lr,
"; temptation = k^2/(2(1+lam)) =", lr - lc)
print("ordering L_cheat < L_rule < L_disc holds:", lc < lr < ld)Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications