What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral”?
Answer: Chapter 5 gives the under-investment caused by hold-up and the bounds on collateral, and shows that collateral the counterparty can seize unilaterally creates reverse hold-up: an honest promisor posts at most 7.75 under unilateral holding but up to 150.00 under third-party escrow.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 150.00, 7.75
| H | unilateral | escrow | rule | simulated_unilateral |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 0.050 | 0.020 | 0.005 | 0.051 |
| 2.0 | 0.200 | 0.040 | 0.010 | 0.206 |
| 4.0 | 0.800 | 0.080 | 0.020 | 0.800 |
| 6.0 | 1.800 | 0.120 | 0.030 | 1.825 |
| 8.0 | 3.200 | 0.160 | 0.040 | 3.194 |
| 10.0 | 5.000 | 0.200 | 0.050 | 4.977 |
| largest H an honest party accepts with S = 3.0: | ||||
| unilateral sqrt(S QMAX / PI) = 7.75 | ||||
| escrow S / E_ESC = 150.00; rule S / E_RULE = 600.00 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p53: reverse hold-up - a collateral the holder can seize
# An honest promisor posts H. Three ways to hold it:
# unilateral: the counterparty may declare a breach on its own say-so.
# A pretext arises with probability PI per deal; a holder whose
# reputation cost Q (uniform on [0, QMAX]) is below H seizes.
# expected loss = PI * min(H / QMAX, 1) * H (grows like H^2)
# escrow: a third party releases on verified evidence, error E_ESC
# rule: an objective trigger written ex ante, error E_RULE
# A seeded simulation checks the unilateral line. Values illustrative.
import math
import random
PI, QMAX, E_ESC, E_RULE = 0.5, 10.0, 0.02, 0.005
def unilateral(h):
return PI * min(h / QMAX, 1.0) * h
print("H unilateral escrow rule simulated_unilateral")
rng = random.Random(41353)
for h in (1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 8.0, 10.0):
lost, n = 0, 20000
for _ in range(n):
if rng.random() < PI and rng.uniform(0.0, QMAX) < h:
lost += 1
sim = lost * h / n
print("{:<5} {:>10.3f} {:>6.3f} {:>5.3f} {:>20.3f}".format(
h, unilateral(h), E_ESC * h, E_RULE * h, sim))
S = 3.0
h_uni = math.sqrt(S * QMAX / PI)
print("largest H an honest party accepts with S = {}:".format(S))
print(" unilateral sqrt(S QMAX / PI) = {:.2f}".format(h_uni))
print(" escrow S / E_ESC = {:.2f}; rule S / E_RULE = {:.2f}".format(
S / E_ESC, S / E_RULE))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications