What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral”?

Answer: Chapter 5 gives the under-investment caused by hold-up and the bounds on collateral, and shows that collateral the counterparty can seize unilaterally creates reverse hold-up: an honest promisor posts at most 7.75 under unilateral holding but up to 150.00 under third-party escrow.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 150.00, 7.75

Hunilateralescrowrulesimulated_unilateral
1.00.0500.0200.0050.051
2.00.2000.0400.0100.206
4.00.8000.0800.0200.800
6.01.8000.1200.0301.825
8.03.2000.1600.0403.194
10.05.0000.2000.0504.977
largest H an honest party accepts with S = 3.0:
unilateral sqrt(S QMAX / PI) = 7.75
escrow S / E_ESC = 150.00; rule S / E_RULE = 600.00
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p53: reverse hold-up - a collateral the holder can seize
# An honest promisor posts H. Three ways to hold it:
#  unilateral: the counterparty may declare a breach on its own say-so.
#     A pretext arises with probability PI per deal; a holder whose
#     reputation cost Q (uniform on [0, QMAX]) is below H seizes.
#     expected loss = PI * min(H / QMAX, 1) * H   (grows like H^2)
#  escrow: a third party releases on verified evidence, error E_ESC
#  rule:   an objective trigger written ex ante, error E_RULE
# A seeded simulation checks the unilateral line. Values illustrative.
import math
import random

PI, QMAX, E_ESC, E_RULE = 0.5, 10.0, 0.02, 0.005


def unilateral(h):
    return PI * min(h / QMAX, 1.0) * h


print("H     unilateral  escrow  rule    simulated_unilateral")
rng = random.Random(41353)
for h in (1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 8.0, 10.0):
    lost, n = 0, 20000
    for _ in range(n):
        if rng.random() < PI and rng.uniform(0.0, QMAX) < h:
            lost += 1
    sim = lost * h / n
    print("{:<5} {:>10.3f}  {:>6.3f}  {:>5.3f}  {:>20.3f}".format(
        h, unilateral(h), E_ESC * h, E_RULE * h, sim))
S = 3.0
h_uni = math.sqrt(S * QMAX / PI)
print("largest H an honest party accepts with S = {}:".format(S))
print("  unilateral sqrt(S QMAX / PI) = {:.2f}".format(h_uni))
print("  escrow S / E_ESC = {:.2f}; rule S / E_RULE = {:.2f}".format(
    S / E_ESC, S / E_RULE))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book