What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions”?
Answer: Chapter 6 compares escrow milestones with paying first or last, and shows that when monitoring errs, expulsion at the first offence wrongly expels 0.506 of steady members while graduated sanctions keep compliance at 0.963.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.506, 0.963
| regime | FP | compliance | steady_expelled | members_left |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| heavy | 0.03 | 1.000 | 0.506 | 97 |
| graduated | 0.03 | 0.963 | 0.000 | 181 |
| verified | 0.003 | 1.000 | 0.087 | 184 |
| closed form, steady member expelled under heavy: | ||||
| FP = 0.03: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = 0.519 | ||||
| FP = 0.003: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = 0.070 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: graduated sanctions versus one heavy sanction
# 200 members over 24 rounds; 160 are steady compliers, 40 are
# opportunists who breach when the gain g ~ U(0, 10) exceeds the
# expected sanction DET * (the sanction their next flag would bring).
# A real breach is flagged with probability DET; a compliant act is
# flagged by mistake with probability FP. Losing membership costs 40.
# heavy first flag -> expulsion
# graduated flags 1, 2, 3 -> fines 3, 6, 12; flag 4 -> expulsion
# verified heavy, but each flag is checked by a third party first,
# which cuts FP tenfold
# Seeded simulation; values illustrative and unit-free.
import random
N_STEADY, N_OPP, ROUNDS, DET, V = 160, 40, 24, 0.6, 40.0
LADDER = [3.0, 6.0, 12.0, V]
def run(regime, fp, seed_rng):
rng = seed_rng
flags = [0] * (N_STEADY + N_OPP)
out = [False] * (N_STEADY + N_OPP)
acts, ok = 0, 0
for _ in range(ROUNDS):
for i in range(N_STEADY + N_OPP):
if out[i]:
continue
if regime == "graduated":
nxt = LADDER[min(flags[i], 3)]
else:
nxt = V
breach = i >= N_STEADY and rng.uniform(0, 10) > DET * nxt
acts += 1
ok += 0 if breach else 1
hit = rng.random() < (DET if breach else fp)
if hit:
flags[i] += 1
if regime != "graduated" or flags[i] >= 4:
out[i] = True
lost = 0
for i in range(N_STEADY):
lost += 1 if out[i] else 0
stay = 0
for i in range(N_STEADY + N_OPP):
stay += 0 if out[i] else 1
return ok / acts, lost / N_STEADY, stay
print("regime FP compliance steady_expelled members_left")
for regime, fp in (("heavy", 0.03), ("graduated", 0.03),
("verified", 0.003)):
c, l, s = run(regime, fp, random.Random(41362))
print("{:<10} {:<6} {:>10.3f} {:>15.3f} {:>12}".format(
regime, fp, c, l, s))
print("closed form, steady member expelled under heavy:")
for fp in (0.03, 0.003):
print(" FP = {}: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = {:.3f}".format(
fp, 1 - (1 - fp) ** ROUNDS))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications