What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions”?

Answer: Chapter 6 compares escrow milestones with paying first or last, and shows that when monitoring errs, expulsion at the first offence wrongly expels 0.506 of steady members while graduated sanctions keep compliance at 0.963.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.506, 0.963

regimeFPcompliancesteady_expelledmembers_left
heavy0.031.0000.50697
graduated0.030.9630.000181
verified0.0031.0000.087184
closed form, steady member expelled under heavy:
FP = 0.03: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = 0.519
FP = 0.003: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = 0.070
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: graduated sanctions versus one heavy sanction
# 200 members over 24 rounds; 160 are steady compliers, 40 are
# opportunists who breach when the gain g ~ U(0, 10) exceeds the
# expected sanction DET * (the sanction their next flag would bring).
# A real breach is flagged with probability DET; a compliant act is
# flagged by mistake with probability FP. Losing membership costs 40.
#  heavy      first flag -> expulsion
#  graduated  flags 1, 2, 3 -> fines 3, 6, 12; flag 4 -> expulsion
#  verified   heavy, but each flag is checked by a third party first,
#             which cuts FP tenfold
# Seeded simulation; values illustrative and unit-free.
import random

N_STEADY, N_OPP, ROUNDS, DET, V = 160, 40, 24, 0.6, 40.0
LADDER = [3.0, 6.0, 12.0, V]


def run(regime, fp, seed_rng):
    rng = seed_rng
    flags = [0] * (N_STEADY + N_OPP)
    out = [False] * (N_STEADY + N_OPP)
    acts, ok = 0, 0
    for _ in range(ROUNDS):
        for i in range(N_STEADY + N_OPP):
            if out[i]:
                continue
            if regime == "graduated":
                nxt = LADDER[min(flags[i], 3)]
            else:
                nxt = V
            breach = i >= N_STEADY and rng.uniform(0, 10) > DET * nxt
            acts += 1
            ok += 0 if breach else 1
            hit = rng.random() < (DET if breach else fp)
            if hit:
                flags[i] += 1
                if regime != "graduated" or flags[i] >= 4:
                    out[i] = True
    lost = 0
    for i in range(N_STEADY):
        lost += 1 if out[i] else 0
    stay = 0
    for i in range(N_STEADY + N_OPP):
        stay += 0 if out[i] else 1
    return ok / acts, lost / N_STEADY, stay


print("regime     FP     compliance  steady_expelled  members_left")
for regime, fp in (("heavy", 0.03), ("graduated", 0.03),
                   ("verified", 0.003)):
    c, l, s = run(regime, fp, random.Random(41362))
    print("{:<10} {:<6} {:>10.3f}  {:>15.3f}  {:>12}".format(
        regime, fp, c, l, s))
print("closed form, steady member expelled under heavy:")
for fp in (0.03, 0.003):
    print("  FP = {}: 1 - (1 - FP)^24 = {:.3f}".format(
        fp, 1 - (1 - fp) ** ROUNDS))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book