What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword”?
Answer: Each of the four sources grasps one face of the commitment problem, and each leaves something out. Hostages without inner good faith do limited work and lose force quickly when outside options improve; a small payment builds reputation, but its signal fails once the probability of imitation exceeds 0.286; covenants without enforcement are only words, yet the enforcer need not be a sword; and the key to self-binding is to restrict action while keeping information.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.286
| A. prior 0.3, follow at 0.6 | ||
| x | posterior | follows |
| 0.00 | 1.000 | True |
| 0.10 | 0.811 | True |
| 0.25 | 0.632 | True |
| 0.50 | 0.462 | False |
| 1.00 | 0.300 | False |
| largest pooling rate that still moves the public: 0.286 | ||
| B. temptation g = 4 | ||
| F | q*(theta=0) | q*(theta=2) |
| 2 | none | 1.000 |
| 4 | 1.000 | 0.500 |
| 8 | 0.500 | 0.250 |
| 16 | 0.250 | 0.125 |
| no sword (q = 0): kept only when theta >= g |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: a small promise kept in public, and a promise backed
# by enforcement.
# A (the pole at the south gate): the public believes with prior P0 that
# the issuer keeps its word. An issuer who does not would still keep a
# small, cheap promise with probability x (to look reliable). After a
# kept small promise: posterior = P0 / (P0 + (1 - P0) x). The public
# follows a new rule when the posterior reaches FOLLOW.
# B (the sword): a covenant is kept iff q * F + theta >= g, where q is
# the chance of enforcement, F the sanction, theta inner commitment.
# q* = (g - theta) / F ; q* > 1 means no enforcement level suffices.
# Exact fractions; values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as Fr
P0, FOLLOW = Fr(3, 10), Fr(3, 5)
print("A. prior 0.3, follow at 0.6")
print("x posterior follows")
for x in (Fr(0), Fr(1, 10), Fr(1, 4), Fr(1, 2), Fr(1)):
post = P0 / (P0 + (1 - P0) * x)
print("{:<5.2f} {:>9.3f} {}".format(float(x), float(post),
post >= FOLLOW))
xmax = P0 * (1 - FOLLOW) / (FOLLOW * (1 - P0))
print("largest pooling rate that still moves the public: {:.3f}".format(
float(xmax)))
print("B. temptation g = 4")
print("F q*(theta=0) q*(theta=2)")
for f in (2, 4, 8, 16):
a = Fr(4, f)
b = Fr(2, f)
sa = "none" if a > 1 else "{:.3f}".format(float(a))
sb = "none" if b > 1 else "{:.3f}".format(float(b))
print("{:<5} {:>11} {:>11}".format(f, sa, sb))
print("no sword (q = 0): kept only when theta >= g")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications