What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword”?

Answer: Each of the four sources grasps one face of the commitment problem, and each leaves something out. Hostages without inner good faith do limited work and lose force quickly when outside options improve; a small payment builds reputation, but its signal fails once the probability of imitation exceeds 0.286; covenants without enforcement are only words, yet the enforcer need not be a sword; and the key to self-binding is to restrict action while keeping information.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.286

A. prior 0.3, follow at 0.6
xposteriorfollows
0.001.000True
0.100.811True
0.250.632True
0.500.462False
1.000.300False
largest pooling rate that still moves the public: 0.286
B. temptation g = 4
Fq*(theta=0)q*(theta=2)
2none1.000
41.0000.500
80.5000.250
160.2500.125
no sword (q = 0): kept only when theta >= g
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: a small promise kept in public, and a promise backed
# by enforcement.
# A (the pole at the south gate): the public believes with prior P0 that
# the issuer keeps its word. An issuer who does not would still keep a
# small, cheap promise with probability x (to look reliable). After a
# kept small promise: posterior = P0 / (P0 + (1 - P0) x). The public
# follows a new rule when the posterior reaches FOLLOW.
# B (the sword): a covenant is kept iff q * F + theta >= g, where q is
# the chance of enforcement, F the sanction, theta inner commitment.
#   q* = (g - theta) / F ; q* > 1 means no enforcement level suffices.
# Exact fractions; values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as Fr

P0, FOLLOW = Fr(3, 10), Fr(3, 5)
print("A. prior 0.3, follow at 0.6")
print("x      posterior  follows")
for x in (Fr(0), Fr(1, 10), Fr(1, 4), Fr(1, 2), Fr(1)):
    post = P0 / (P0 + (1 - P0) * x)
    print("{:<5.2f}  {:>9.3f}  {}".format(float(x), float(post),
                                         post >= FOLLOW))
xmax = P0 * (1 - FOLLOW) / (FOLLOW * (1 - P0))
print("largest pooling rate that still moves the public: {:.3f}".format(
    float(xmax)))
print("B. temptation g = 4")
print("F     q*(theta=0)  q*(theta=2)")
for f in (2, 4, 8, 16):
    a = Fr(4, f)
    b = Fr(2, f)
    sa = "none" if a > 1 else "{:.3f}".format(float(a))
    sb = "none" if b > 1 else "{:.3f}".format(float(b))
    print("{:<5} {:>11}  {:>11}".format(f, sa, sb))
print("no sword (q = 0): kept only when theta >= g")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book