Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts: chapter answers
The popular view of promises holds that a verbal promise will certainly be broken once payoffs turn against the promisor, that more collateral is always safer, and that keeping gains while rewriting the rules after losses is a flaw of character. This book rewrites all three as propositions that data could refute. After checking the sources it corrects the founding blueprint: Barro and Gordon's paper on reputation appeared in the Journal of Monetary Economics; Strotz's paper is dated 1956 by common practice; the experimental paper on self-imposed deadlines listed in the blueprint has been retr…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
Chapter 1 uses the toy model of Kydland and Prescott to show that breach is most tempting in the period it happens, while lost credibility costs more in every period after; under grim trigger, reputation keeps the rule… - Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
Present bias makes one person choose differently at different dates. Hyperbolic discounting reverses the preference at 5.00 days; quasi-hyperbolic discounting reverses it the moment the smaller reward lands today. Sophi… - Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
Chapter 3 holds the core arithmetic: in a one-off relationship the probability of breach falls with collateral plus relationship value, and keeping it at 0.10 needs collateral of 7.63; in a repeated relationship with co… - Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
Chapter 4 writes limited liability as a call option, whose holder gains 10.94 as volatility rises, and shows that a loss-averse partner refuses to join once the probability of rules being rewritten after the fact exceed… - Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
Chapter 5 gives the under-investment caused by hold-up and the bounds on collateral, and shows that collateral the counterparty can seize unilaterally creates reverse hold-up: an honest promisor posts at most 7.75 under… - Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
Chapter 6 compares escrow milestones with paying first or last, and shows that when monitoring errs, expulsion at the first offence wrongly expels 0.506 of steady members while graduated sanctions keep compliance at 0.9… - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
Each of the four sources grasps one face of the commitment problem, and each leaves something out. Hostages without inner good faith do limited work and lose force quickly when outside options improve; a small payment b… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications
Chapter 8 gives the commitment ledger, the distilled Anti-Hold-Up Collateral and Reneging Threshold Calculator, checker specification tables and a pre-registered test needing 199 deals per group. Marked boxes separate p…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote