Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts: chapter answers

The popular view of promises holds that a verbal promise will certainly be broken once payoffs turn against the promisor, that more collateral is always safer, and that keeping gains while rewriting the rules after losses is a flaw of character. This book rewrites all three as propositions that data could refute. After checking the sources it corrects the founding blueprint: Barro and Gordon's paper on reputation appeared in the Journal of Monetary Economics; Strotz's paper is dated 1956 by common practice; the experimental paper on self-imposed deadlines listed in the blueprint has been retr…

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · 中文版

Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote