What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting”?
Answer: Chapter 4 writes limited liability as a call option, whose holder gains 10.94 as volatility rises, and shows that a loss-averse partner refuses to join once the probability of rules being rewritten after the fact exceeds 0.461.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 10.94
| V0 = 100.0, F = 80.0, r = 0.02, steps = 400 | ||||
| sigma | owner_call | creditor | shift_vs_0.20 | vega_per_0.01 |
| 0.1 | 21.61 | 78.39 | -0.94 | 0.018 |
| 0.2 | 22.54 | 77.46 | 0.00 | 0.166 |
| 0.3 | 24.70 | 75.30 | 2.16 | 0.250 |
| 0.4 | 27.43 | 72.57 | 4.88 | 0.289 |
| 0.5 | 30.40 | 69.60 | 7.86 | 0.304 |
| 0.6 | 33.48 | 66.52 | 10.94 | 0.314 |
| default-free value of F today: 78.42 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: limited liability is a call option (Merton 1974)
# A venture worth V0 owes a fixed claim F at time 1. The owner with
# limited liability receives max(V - F, 0): a European call on V. The
# creditor holds V - call = F minus a put. Priced on a Cox-Ross-
# Rubinstein binomial tree (risk-neutral, rate r). As volatility rises
# the call gains and the creditor's claim loses the same amount:
# that wealth moves without any change in V0. Values illustrative.
# The vega column is the gain per 0.01 of sigma (central difference).
import math
V0, FACE, R, T, STEPS = 100.0, 80.0, 0.02, 1.0, 400
def crr_call(sigma):
dt = T / STEPS
u = math.exp(sigma * math.sqrt(dt))
d = 1.0 / u
q = (math.exp(R * dt) - d) / (u - d)
disc = math.exp(-R * dt)
vals = [max(V0 * u ** j * d ** (STEPS - j) - FACE, 0.0)
for j in range(STEPS + 1)]
for n in range(STEPS, 0, -1):
vals = [disc * (q * vals[j + 1] + (1.0 - q) * vals[j])
for j in range(n)]
return vals[0]
base = crr_call(0.2)
print("V0 = {}, F = {}, r = {}, steps = {}".format(V0, FACE, R, STEPS))
print("sigma owner_call creditor shift_vs_0.20 vega_per_0.01")
for s in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6):
c = crr_call(s)
vega = (crr_call(s + 0.005) - crr_call(s - 0.005))
print("{:<5} {:>10.2f} {:>8.2f} {:>13.2f} {:>13.3f}".format(
s, c, V0 - c, c - base, vega))
riskfree_debt = FACE * math.exp(-R * T)
print("default-free value of F today: {:.2f}".format(riskfree_debt))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 3 · The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications