What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting”?

Answer: Chapter 4 writes limited liability as a call option, whose holder gains 10.94 as volatility rises, and shows that a loss-averse partner refuses to join once the probability of rules being rewritten after the fact exceeds 0.461.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 10.94

V0 = 100.0, F = 80.0, r = 0.02, steps = 400
sigmaowner_callcreditorshift_vs_0.20vega_per_0.01
0.121.6178.39-0.940.018
0.222.5477.460.000.166
0.324.7075.302.160.250
0.427.4372.574.880.289
0.530.4069.607.860.304
0.633.4866.5210.940.314
default-free value of F today: 78.42
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: limited liability is a call option (Merton 1974)
# A venture worth V0 owes a fixed claim F at time 1. The owner with
# limited liability receives max(V - F, 0): a European call on V. The
# creditor holds V - call = F minus a put. Priced on a Cox-Ross-
# Rubinstein binomial tree (risk-neutral, rate r). As volatility rises
# the call gains and the creditor's claim loses the same amount:
# that wealth moves without any change in V0. Values illustrative.
# The vega column is the gain per 0.01 of sigma (central difference).
import math

V0, FACE, R, T, STEPS = 100.0, 80.0, 0.02, 1.0, 400


def crr_call(sigma):
    dt = T / STEPS
    u = math.exp(sigma * math.sqrt(dt))
    d = 1.0 / u
    q = (math.exp(R * dt) - d) / (u - d)
    disc = math.exp(-R * dt)
    vals = [max(V0 * u ** j * d ** (STEPS - j) - FACE, 0.0)
            for j in range(STEPS + 1)]
    for n in range(STEPS, 0, -1):
        vals = [disc * (q * vals[j + 1] + (1.0 - q) * vals[j])
                for j in range(n)]
    return vals[0]


base = crr_call(0.2)
print("V0 = {}, F = {}, r = {}, steps = {}".format(V0, FACE, R, STEPS))
print("sigma  owner_call  creditor  shift_vs_0.20  vega_per_0.01")
for s in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6):
    c = crr_call(s)
    vega = (crr_call(s + 0.005) - crr_call(s - 0.005))
    print("{:<5}  {:>10.2f}  {:>8.2f}  {:>13.2f}  {:>13.3f}".format(
        s, c, V0 - c, c - base, vega))
riskfree_debt = FACE * math.exp(-R * T)
print("default-free value of F today: {:.2f}".format(riskfree_debt))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book