What does Time Inconsistency and Anti-Hold-Up Collateral conclude, in numbers, about “The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor”?
Answer: Chapter 3 holds the core arithmetic: in a one-off relationship the probability of breach falls with collateral plus relationship value, and keeping it at 0.10 needs collateral of 7.63; in a repeated relationship with common payoffs the grim-trigger bar is 0.500 and the risk-dominance bar 0.600; with a public end date the largest bond equals the last-round temptation.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal advice and not individual financial or business advice, every example is synthetic, and all prices are unit-free. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.10, 0.500, 7.63
| median reversal X = 4.0, log-sd = 0.6 | |||
| H | R=0 | R=1 | R=3 |
| 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.990 | 0.684 |
| 1.0 | 0.990 | 0.876 | 0.500 |
| 2.0 | 0.876 | 0.684 | 0.355 |
| 4.0 | 0.500 | 0.355 | 0.175 |
| 6.0 | 0.250 | 0.175 | 0.088 |
| 8.0 | 0.124 | 0.088 | 0.046 |
| 12.0 | 0.034 | 0.025 | 0.014 |
| H needed for P(renege) <= 0.10: R=1 -> 7.63, R=3 -> 5.63 | |||
| H needed for P(renege) <= 0.05: R=1 -> 9.73, R=3 -> 7.73 | |||
| H needed for P(renege) <= 0.01: R=1 -> 15.15, R=3 -> 13.15 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: the reneging threshold as incentive arithmetic
# After the state is revealed the promisor can keep the promise or break
# it. Breaking yields an ex post gain X (the size of the payoff
# reversal); it costs the forfeited collateral H plus the discounted
# reputation loss R. Breaking is the equilibrium move iff X > H + R.
# X is lognormal across states: ln X ~ N(mu, s). Then
# P(renege) = 1 - Phi((ln(H + R) - mu) / s).
# "Certain default" is the corner H + R = 0 with X > 0. Illustrative.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist
MU, S = math.log(4.0), 0.6
Z = NormalDist()
def p_renege(h, r):
c = h + r
if c <= 0:
return 1.0
return 1.0 - Z.cdf((math.log(c) - MU) / S)
print("median reversal X = {:.1f}, log-sd = {}".format(math.exp(MU), S))
print("H R=0 R=1 R=3")
for h in (0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 8.0, 12.0):
print("{:<5} {:.3f} {:.3f} {:.3f}".format(
h, p_renege(h, 0.0), p_renege(h, 1.0), p_renege(h, 3.0)))
def h_for(target, r):
c = math.exp(MU + S * Z.inv_cdf(1.0 - target))
return max(0.0, c - r)
for tgt in (0.10, 0.05, 0.01):
print("H needed for P(renege) <= {:.2f}: R=1 -> {:.2f}, R=3 -> {:.2f}"
.format(tgt, h_for(tgt, 1.0), h_for(tgt, 3.0)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Reneging Threshold: Incentive Arithmetic and the Critical Discount Factor. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-422 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026422,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dynamic Time-Inconsistency, Asymmetric Freeroll Reneging and Collateralised Anti-Hold-Up Contracts},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Rules and Discretion: Why Optimal Plans Undo Themselves
- Chapter 2 · Present Bias: Preference Reversal and Self-Imposed Deposits
- Chapter 4 · Freerolls: Convex Payoffs under Limited Liability and Ex Post Rule Rewriting
- Chapter 5 · Hold-Up: Specific Investment, Hostages and the Bounds on Collateral
- Chapter 6 · Escrow, Automatic Execution and Graduated Sanctions
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Zhou-Zheng Hostage Exchange, the Pole at the South Gate and Leviathan's Sword
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: The Commitment Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications