What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling”?

Answer: At an offer of zero, only responders whose threshold is zero accept, and the proposer expects just 10.00. As the offer rises, the probability of acceptance climbs faster than the proposer's own part falls: at an offer of 30 the acceptance probability is 0.70 and the expectation 49.00; at 40 it is 0.90 and the expectation 54.00, the best in this table. An offer of fifty is certainly accepted, but the expectation falls to 50.00.

Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.70, 0.90, 10.00, 30, 40, 49.00

offerP(accept)proposer EVresponder EV
00.1010.000.00
100.2522.502.50
200.4536.009.00
300.7049.0021.00
400.9054.0036.00
501.0050.0050.00
best offer 40 with EV 54.00
subgame-perfect offer with no rejections: the minimum unit
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p61: why a profit-seeking proposer offers near half.
# Model: ultimatum game over 100 units. Each responder rejects offers
# below a private threshold m; the proposer only knows the
# distribution of m. Expected payoff of offer o is (100 - o) P(m <= o).
# The threshold distribution below is illustrative, NOT data; it
# stands for the qualitative pattern that low offers are often
# rejected (Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982; Guth and Kocher
# 2014). Exact fractions.
from fractions import Fraction as F

THRESH = ((0, F(10, 100)), (10, F(15, 100)), (20, F(20, 100)),
          (30, F(25, 100)), (40, F(20, 100)), (50, F(10, 100)))


def accept(o):
    p = F(0)
    for m, w in THRESH:
        if m <= o:
            p = p + w
    return p


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("offer  P(accept)  proposer EV  responder EV")
    best = None
    for o in range(0, 60, 10):
        p = accept(o)
        ev = (100 - o) * p
        print("{:5d} {:10.2f} {:12.2f} {:13.2f}".format(
            o, float(p), float(ev), float(o * p)))
        if best is None or ev > best[1]:
            best = (o, ev)
    print("best offer {} with EV {:.2f}".format(best[0], float(best[1])))
    print("subgame-perfect offer with no rejections: the minimum unit")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book