The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes: chapter answers
When brands and creators negotiate a co-branding split, the most common answer is fifty-fifty. Using the axiomatic solution of Nash's 1950 paper "The Bargaining Problem", this book overturns the belief that fifty-fifty is the fair point: the Nash solution first returns to each side what it would get if talks failed, then divides the surplus of the collaboration, and it is shaped by the concavity of utility, that is, by attitudes to risk. Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash…
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- Chapter 1 · Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product
The third and fourth rows diverge. When the creator would get ten and the brand thirty without a deal, the Nash split gives the creator 40.00, not fifty; fifty-fifty then yields a Nash product of only 800.00 against a m… - Chapter 2 · Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown
With a breakdown probability of one half, the first proposer has a large advantage: proposing first, the creator takes 70.0000, but only 50.0000 when the brand proposes first. At a probability of one tenth the two figur… - Chapter 3 · Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side
Chapter 3 uses power utility to show that the more risk-averse side gives up share, and computes that on a two-point risky pool a guarantee raises the creator's certainty equivalent by 2.8433 and the brand's expectation… - Chapter 4 · The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power
Chapter 4 uses Rubinstein's 1982 alternating offers to show that patience is bargaining power, converging as offers come faster to the asymmetric Nash solution with weight 0.2000. - Chapter 5 · The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Chapter 5 sets the 1975 solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky beside Nash's. - Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
At an offer of zero, only responders whose threshold is zero accept, and the proposer expects just 10.00. As the offer rises, the probability of acceptance climbs faster than the proposer's own part falls: at an offer o… - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
Chapter 7 examines Bai Gui's rule "take what others discard, give out what others take" in the Records of the Grand Historian and the contract curve of Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics of 1881. - Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test
Chapter 8 gives a negotiation table for co-branding and creator splits, the distilled Co-Branding Split Bargainer and a pre-registered test needing 122 deals per group, stating which results would overturn the central c…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote