What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power”?

Answer: Chapter 4 uses Rubinstein's 1982 alternating offers to show that patience is bargaining power, converging as offers come faster to the asymmetric Nash solution with weight 0.2000.

Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.2000

r1 = 0.20 (creator), r2 = 0.05 (brand)
hcreator firstbrand firstgap
1.0000.22050.18050.0400
0.5000.21010.19010.0200
0.1000.20200.19800.0040
0.0100.20020.19980.0004
0.0010.20000.20000.0000
limit beta = r2/(r1+r2) = 0.2000
impatience costs the creator 30.0 points of 100
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p43: from Rubinstein to asymmetric Nash.
# Model: delays of length h, discount rates r1, r2 per period of the
# calendar (delta_i = exp(-r_i h)). As h shrinks, Rubinstein's share
# for player 1 tends to r2 / (r1 + r2): the asymmetric Nash solution
# with weight beta = r2 / (r1 + r2) (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
# 1986). Rates are illustrative: creator r1 = 0.20, brand r2 = 0.05.
import math

R1, R2 = 0.20, 0.05


def rub(d1, d2):
    return (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 * d2)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    limit = R2 / (R1 + R2)
    print("r1 = {:.2f} (creator), r2 = {:.2f} (brand)".format(R1, R2))
    print("      h   creator first   brand first   gap")
    for h in (1.0, 0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001):
        d1, d2 = math.exp(-R1 * h), math.exp(-R2 * h)
        a = rub(d1, d2)
        b = 1 - rub(d2, d1)
        print("{:7.3f} {:15.4f} {:13.4f} {:7.4f}".format(h, a, b, a - b))
    print("limit beta = r2/(r1+r2) = {:.4f}".format(limit))
    print("impatience costs the creator {:.1f} points of 100".format(
        100 * (0.5 - limit)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book