What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power”?
Answer: Chapter 4 uses Rubinstein's 1982 alternating offers to show that patience is bargaining power, converging as offers come faster to the asymmetric Nash solution with weight 0.2000.
Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.2000
| r1 = 0.20 (creator), r2 = 0.05 (brand) | |||
| h | creator first | brand first | gap |
| 1.000 | 0.2205 | 0.1805 | 0.0400 |
| 0.500 | 0.2101 | 0.1901 | 0.0200 |
| 0.100 | 0.2020 | 0.1980 | 0.0040 |
| 0.010 | 0.2002 | 0.1998 | 0.0004 |
| 0.001 | 0.2000 | 0.2000 | 0.0000 |
| limit beta = r2/(r1+r2) = 0.2000 | |||
| impatience costs the creator 30.0 points of 100 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p43: from Rubinstein to asymmetric Nash.
# Model: delays of length h, discount rates r1, r2 per period of the
# calendar (delta_i = exp(-r_i h)). As h shrinks, Rubinstein's share
# for player 1 tends to r2 / (r1 + r2): the asymmetric Nash solution
# with weight beta = r2 / (r1 + r2) (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
# 1986). Rates are illustrative: creator r1 = 0.20, brand r2 = 0.05.
import math
R1, R2 = 0.20, 0.05
def rub(d1, d2):
return (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 * d2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
limit = R2 / (R1 + R2)
print("r1 = {:.2f} (creator), r2 = {:.2f} (brand)".format(R1, R2))
print(" h creator first brand first gap")
for h in (1.0, 0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001):
d1, d2 = math.exp(-R1 * h), math.exp(-R2 * h)
a = rub(d1, d2)
b = 1 - rub(d2, d1)
print("{:7.3f} {:15.4f} {:13.4f} {:7.4f}".format(h, a, b, a - b))
print("limit beta = r2/(r1+r2) = {:.4f}".format(limit))
print("impatience costs the creator {:.1f} points of 100".format(
100 * (0.5 - limit)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product
- Chapter 2 · Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown
- Chapter 3 · Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side
- Chapter 5 · The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
- Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test