What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product”?
Answer: The third and fourth rows diverge. When the creator would get ten and the brand thirty without a deal, the Nash split gives the creator 40.00, not fifty; fifty-fifty then yields a Nash product of only 800.00 against a maximum of 900.00, a ratio of 0.8889. Swap the two disagreement payoffs and the Nash split gives the creator sixty. The same pool and the same contributions produce a difference of twenty units purely because one side has a better fallback.
Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.8889, 40.00, 800.00, 900.00
| pool S = 100 units; creator share x, brand share S - x | ||||||
| dC | dB | Nash x | brute x | NP(Nash) | NP(50/50) | 50/50 keeps |
| 0 | 0 | 50.00 | 50 | 2500.00 | 2500.00 | 1.0000 |
| 10 | 10 | 50.00 | 50 | 1600.00 | 1600.00 | 1.0000 |
| 10 | 30 | 40.00 | 40 | 900.00 | 800.00 | 0.8889 |
| 30 | 10 | 60.00 | 60 | 900.00 | 800.00 | 0.8889 |
| 0 | 40 | 30.00 | 30 | 900.00 | 500.00 | 0.5556 |
| 20 | 50 | 35.00 | 35 | 225.00 | 0.00 | n/a |
| 45 | 5 | 70.00 | 70 | 625.00 | 225.00 | 0.3600 |
| 50/50 equals the Nash split only when dC = dB | ||||||
| each unit of dC moves the Nash split by 1/2 unit |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: the symmetric Nash split is not fifty-fifty.
# Model: a co-branding profit pool S is split x to the creator (C) and
# S - x to the brand (B); disagreement payoffs dC, dB are what each gets
# if no deal is signed. Nash (1950): maximise (x - dC)(S - x - dB).
# With linear utility the maximiser is x* = dC + (S - dC - dB) / 2.
# The exact answer is checked against a brute-force search over all
# splits in steps of one unit. Parameters are illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
S = 100
def nash_split(dc, db):
return F(dc) + F(S - dc - db, 2)
def product(x, dc, db):
return (x - dc) * (S - x - db)
def brute(dc, db):
best = None
for x in range(dc, S - db + 1):
p = product(F(x), dc, db)
if best is None or p > best[0]:
best = (p, x)
return best[1]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("pool S = {} units; creator share x, brand share S - x".format(S))
print(" dC dB Nash x brute x NP(Nash) NP(50/50) 50/50 keeps")
for dc, db in ((0, 0), (10, 10), (10, 30), (30, 10),
(0, 40), (20, 50), (45, 5)):
x = nash_split(dc, db)
npn = product(x, dc, db)
np5 = product(F(50), dc, db)
keep = "n/a" if np5 <= 0 else "{:.4f}".format(float(np5 / npn))
print("{:3d} {:3d} {:7.2f} {:8d} {:9.2f} {:10.2f} {:>10s}".format(
dc, db, float(x), brute(dc, db), float(npn), float(np5),
keep))
print("50/50 equals the Nash split only when dC = dB")
print("each unit of dC moves the Nash split by 1/2 unit")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown
- Chapter 3 · Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side
- Chapter 4 · The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power
- Chapter 5 · The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
- Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test