What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown”?
Answer: With a breakdown probability of one half, the first proposer has a large advantage: proposing first, the creator takes 70.0000, but only 50.0000 when the brand proposes first. At a probability of one tenth the two figures close in to 61.5789 and 58.4211; at one in a thousand, to 60.0150 and 59.9850. The midpoint is exactly 60.0000 in every row, the Nash split with outside options as the disagreement point.
Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 50.0000, 58.4211, 59.9850, 60.0000, 60.0150, 61.5789
| pool 100, dC = 30, dB = 10, Nash split x = 60.0 | |||
| p | creator proposes | brand proposes | midpoint |
| 0.500 | 70.0000 | 50.0000 | 60.0000 |
| 0.200 | 63.3333 | 56.6667 | 60.0000 |
| 0.100 | 61.5789 | 58.4211 | 60.0000 |
| 0.020 | 60.3030 | 59.6970 | 60.0000 |
| 0.001 | 60.0150 | 59.9850 | 60.0000 |
| as p -> 0 both shares -> 60.0 (the Nash split) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p23: when breakdown risk drives the bargain.
# Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986): alternating offers in which
# each rejection ends talks with probability p, after which each side
# takes its outside option (dC, dB). Stationary equilibrium, creator
# proposing: x = (S - dB + (1 - p) dC) / (2 - p), solved exactly.
# As p goes to zero, x tends to the Nash split with (dC, dB) as the
# disagreement point. Pool S = 100, dC = 30, dB = 10. Illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
S, DC, DB = 100, 30, 10
def proposer_share(p):
return (S - DB + (1 - p) * DC) / (2 - p)
def responder_share(p):
# creator's share when the brand proposes (symmetric formula)
z = (S - DC + (1 - p) * DB) / (2 - p)
return S - z
if __name__ == "__main__":
nash = F(DC) + F(S - DC - DB, 2)
print("pool {}, dC = {}, dB = {}, Nash split x = {}".format(
S, DC, DB, float(nash)))
print(" p creator proposes brand proposes midpoint")
for p in (F(1, 2), F(1, 5), F(1, 10), F(1, 50), F(1, 1000)):
a = proposer_share(p)
b = responder_share(p)
mid = (a + b) / 2
print("{:6.3f} {:16.4f} {:15.4f} {:9.4f}".format(
float(p), float(a), float(b), float(mid)))
print("as p -> 0 both shares -> {} (the Nash split)".format(
float(nash)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product
- Chapter 3 · Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side
- Chapter 4 · The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power
- Chapter 5 · The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
- Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test