关于「威胁点从哪里来:外部选项、僵持收益与破裂风险」,《纳什议价与联名分润》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:破裂概率为一半时,先出价的一方优势很大:达人先出价拿 70.0000,品牌先出价时达人只拿 50.0000。破裂概率降到十分之一,两个数收拢到 61.5789 与 58.4211;降到千分之一,收拢到 60.0150 与 59.9850。两者的中点在每一行都正好是 60.0000,也就是以外部选项为分歧点的纳什解。
数据口径:在一组示意参数下,达人外部选项 10、品牌 30 时,五五开只保住最大纳什积的 0.8889。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营或法律建议。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 50.0000, 58.4211, 59.9850, 60.0000, 60.0150, 61.5789
| pool 100, dC = 30, dB = 10, Nash split x = 60.0 | |||
| p | creator proposes | brand proposes | midpoint |
| 0.500 | 70.0000 | 50.0000 | 60.0000 |
| 0.200 | 63.3333 | 56.6667 | 60.0000 |
| 0.100 | 61.5789 | 58.4211 | 60.0000 |
| 0.020 | 60.3030 | 59.6970 | 60.0000 |
| 0.001 | 60.0150 | 59.9850 | 60.0000 |
| as p -> 0 both shares -> 60.0 (the Nash split) |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p23: when breakdown risk drives the bargain.
# Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986): alternating offers in which
# each rejection ends talks with probability p, after which each side
# takes its outside option (dC, dB). Stationary equilibrium, creator
# proposing: x = (S - dB + (1 - p) dC) / (2 - p), solved exactly.
# As p goes to zero, x tends to the Nash split with (dC, dB) as the
# disagreement point. Pool S = 100, dC = 30, dB = 10. Illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
S, DC, DB = 100, 30, 10
def proposer_share(p):
return (S - DB + (1 - p) * DC) / (2 - p)
def responder_share(p):
# creator's share when the brand proposes (symmetric formula)
z = (S - DC + (1 - p) * DB) / (2 - p)
return S - z
if __name__ == "__main__":
nash = F(DC) + F(S - DC - DB, 2)
print("pool {}, dC = {}, dB = {}, Nash split x = {}".format(
S, DC, DB, float(nash)))
print(" p creator proposes brand proposes midpoint")
for p in (F(1, 2), F(1, 5), F(1, 10), F(1, 50), F(1, 1000)):
a = proposer_share(p)
b = responder_share(p)
mid = (a + b) / 2
print("{:6.3f} {:16.4f} {:15.4f} {:9.4f}".format(
float(p), float(a), float(b), float(mid)))
print("as p -> 0 both shares -> {} (the Nash split)".format(
float(nash)))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《纳什议价解与联名分润、外部选项威胁点与风险态度的分配母典》第 2 章「威胁点从哪里来:外部选项、僵持收益与破裂风险」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}