关于「Kalai–Smorodinsky 对照:单调性与无关选项独立」,《纳什议价与联名分润》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第五章以 Kalai 与 Smorodinsky 1975 年的解作对照。

数据口径:在一组示意参数下,达人外部选项 10、品牌 30 时,五五开只保住最大纳什积的 0.8889。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营或法律建议。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库

S  Nash (3/4, 3/4)  KS (3/4, 3/4)
T  Nash (1, 7/10)  KS (10/13, 10/13)
player 2 under Nash: S 0.7500 -> T 0.7000
player 2 under KS:   S 0.7500 -> T 0.7692
Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p51: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky on piecewise-linear sets.
# Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) example: S = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(3/4,3/4),
# (1,0)} and T = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(1,7/10),(1,0)}. T contains S and
# each player's best possible payoff is 1 in both, yet the Nash point
# gives player 2 less in T. KS picks the frontier point on the line
# from the disagreement point (0,0) to the ideal point. Exact
# fractions: on each frontier segment the Nash product is a quadratic,
# maximised at a vertex or at its stationary point.
from fractions import Fraction as F


def nash(front):
    best = None
    for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
        cands = [F(0), F(1)]
        # u = a + t (b - a); product quadratic in t
        p2 = (b1 - a1) * (b2 - a2)
        p1 = a1 * (b2 - a2) + a2 * (b1 - a1)
        if p2 < 0:
            t = -p1 / (2 * p2)
            if 0 < t < 1:
                cands.append(t)
        for t in cands:
            u = (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
            if best is None or u[0] * u[1] > best[0]:
                best = (u[0] * u[1], u)
    return best[1]


def ks(front):
    m1 = max(p[0] for p in front)
    m2 = max(p[1] for p in front)
    for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
        # solve a2 + t (b2 - a2) = (m2 / m1)(a1 + t (b1 - a1))
        k = m2 / m1
        den = (b2 - a2) - k * (b1 - a1)
        if den != 0:
            t = (k * a1 - a2) / den
            if 0 <= t <= 1:
                return (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
    return None


def show(name, front):
    n, k = nash(front), ks(front)
    print("{}  Nash ({}, {})  KS ({}, {})".format(
        name, n[0], n[1], k[0], k[1]))
    return n, k


if __name__ == "__main__":
    S = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(3, 4), F(3, 4)), (F(1), F(0))]
    T = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(1), F(7, 10)), (F(1), F(0))]
    ns, ks_ = show("S", S)
    nt, kt = show("T", T)
    print("player 2 under Nash: S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
        float(ns[1]), float(nt[1])))
    print("player 2 under KS:   S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
        float(ks_[1]), float(kt[1])))
    print("Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《纳什议价解与联名分润、外部选项威胁点与风险态度的分配母典》第 5 章「Kalai–Smorodinsky 对照:单调性与无关选项独立」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论