关于「联名分润谈判表:实证闭环、议价器与预注册检验」,《纳什议价与联名分润》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第八章给出联名与达人分润谈判表、蒸馏小工具「联名分润议价器」与每组 122 单的预注册检验方案,写明什么结果会推翻核心命题;谈判建议只要求披露真实外部选项,不教虚报与欺骗性威胁。书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(18 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

数据口径:在一组示意参数下,达人外部选项 10、品牌 30 时,五五开只保住最大纳什积的 0.8889。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营或法律建议。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 122

alpha 0.05 two-sided, power 0.90
gapsdn per grouptotal
10123162
512122244
10154896
515190380
312337674
primary design: gap 5, sd 12 -> 122 deals per group
z values: 1.9600 and 1.2816
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 8. p82: sample size for the pre-registered test.
# Design: deals are classed in advance by disclosed outside options as
# creator-advantaged (dC - dB >= 10) or brand-advantaged
# (dB - dC >= 10). Fifty-fifty predicts equal mean creator shares in
# both groups; the Nash rule predicts a gap of at least 10 points,
# and the primary design is powered for half of it.
# Two-sample z approximation: n per group =
# 2 (z_{1-alpha/2} + z_{1-power})^2 sd^2 / gap^2, rounded up.
# Standard deviations and gaps are planning assumptions, not data.
import math
from statistics import NormalDist

Z = NormalDist()


def n_per_group(gap, sd, alpha=0.05, power=0.90):
    za = Z.inv_cdf(1 - alpha / 2)
    zb = Z.inv_cdf(power)
    return math.ceil(2 * (za + zb) ** 2 * sd ** 2 / gap ** 2)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("alpha 0.05 two-sided, power 0.90")
    print(" gap  sd   n per group  total")
    for gap, sd in ((10, 12), (5, 12), (10, 15), (5, 15), (3, 12)):
        n = n_per_group(gap, sd)
        print("{:4d} {:3d} {:12d} {:6d}".format(gap, sd, n, 2 * n))
    n = n_per_group(5, 12)
    print("primary design: gap 5, sd 12 -> {} deals per group".format(n))
    print("z values: {:.4f} and {:.4f}".format(
        Z.inv_cdf(0.975), Z.inv_cdf(0.90)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《纳什议价解与联名分润、外部选项威胁点与风险态度的分配母典》第 8 章「联名分润谈判表:实证闭环、议价器与预注册检验」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论