关于「风险态度:效用的凹度怎样把钱让给对方」,《纳什议价与联名分润》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第三章用幂效用说明更厌恶风险的一方让出份额,并算出在两点风险的分润池上,保底合同让达人的确定性等值多 2.8433、品牌期望多 0.8384。

数据口径:在一组示意参数下,达人外部选项 10、品牌 30 时,五五开只保住最大纳什积的 0.8889。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营或法律建议。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.8384, 2.8433

mean pool 100.0; creator u = x^0.5
A pure share: s = 0.3682
   creator mean 36.8171  CE 33.1354
   brand mean   63.1829
   risk premium borne by creator 3.6817
B guarantee: fee f = 35.9787 (CE = fee)
   brand mean   64.0213
gain from B over A: creator CE +2.8433, brand +0.8384
Nash products: A 86.0783  B 96.4826
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p32: a risky pool, pure revenue share versus a guarantee.
# Model: pool R is 160 or 40 with probability 1/2 each (mean 100).
# Creator: u(x) = x^0.5 (risk averse); brand: risk neutral. Outside
# options dC = 10, dB = 30 in money, received for certain.
# Contract A: creator gets share s of R. Contract B: creator gets a
# fixed fee f, the brand keeps R - f. Each contract's terms are set by
# the Nash product of expected-utility gains; golden-section search.
# CE = certainty equivalent. Parameters are illustrative.
import math

HI, LO, PR = 160.0, 40.0, 0.5
A, DC, DB = 0.5, 10.0, 30.0
MEAN = math.fsum([PR * HI, (1 - PR) * LO])


def eu_share(s):
    return math.fsum([PR * (s * HI) ** A, (1 - PR) * (s * LO) ** A])


def np_share(s):
    g1 = eu_share(s) - DC ** A
    g2 = (1 - s) * MEAN - DB
    return g1 * g2 if g1 > 0 and g2 > 0 else -1.0


def np_fee(f):
    g1 = f ** A - DC ** A
    g2 = MEAN - f - DB
    return g1 * g2 if g1 > 0 and g2 > 0 else -1.0


def golden(fn, lo, hi, tol=1e-12):
    r = (math.sqrt(5) - 1) / 2
    while hi - lo > tol:
        c, d = hi - r * (hi - lo), lo + r * (hi - lo)
        if fn(c) > fn(d):
            hi = d
        else:
            lo = c
    return (lo + hi) / 2


if __name__ == "__main__":
    s = golden(np_share, 0.0, 1.0)
    ce = eu_share(s) ** (1 / A)
    b_share = (1 - s) * MEAN
    print("mean pool {:.1f}; creator u = x^{}".format(MEAN, A))
    print("A pure share: s = {:.4f}".format(s))
    print("   creator mean {:.4f}  CE {:.4f}".format(s * MEAN, ce))
    print("   brand mean   {:.4f}".format(b_share))
    print("   risk premium borne by creator {:.4f}".format(
        s * MEAN - ce))
    f = golden(np_fee, DC, MEAN - DB)
    print("B guarantee: fee f = {:.4f} (CE = fee)".format(f))
    print("   brand mean   {:.4f}".format(MEAN - f))
    print("gain from B over A: creator CE {:+.4f}, brand {:+.4f}".format(
        f - ce, (MEAN - f) - b_share))
    print("Nash products: A {:.4f}  B {:.4f}".format(
        np_share(s), np_fee(f)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《纳什议价解与联名分润、外部选项威胁点与风险态度的分配母典》第 3 章「风险态度:效用的凹度怎样把钱让给对方」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论