关于「五五开为什么到处都是:最后通牒、聚点与讨价还价的成本」,《纳什议价与联名分润》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:出价为零时,只有门槛为零的回应者会接受,提议者期望只拿 10.00。出价逐步提高,接受概率上升得比留给自己的部分下降得快;出价 30 时接受概率为 0.70,期望 49.00;出价 40 时接受概率为 0.90,期望 54.00,是这张表里的最优。出价五十时一定被接受,但期望降到 50.00。

数据口径:在一组示意参数下,达人外部选项 10、品牌 30 时,五五开只保住最大纳什积的 0.8889。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营或法律建议。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.70, 0.90, 10.00, 30, 40, 49.00

offerP(accept)proposer EVresponder EV
00.1010.000.00
100.2522.502.50
200.4536.009.00
300.7049.0021.00
400.9054.0036.00
501.0050.0050.00
best offer 40 with EV 54.00
subgame-perfect offer with no rejections: the minimum unit
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p61: why a profit-seeking proposer offers near half.
# Model: ultimatum game over 100 units. Each responder rejects offers
# below a private threshold m; the proposer only knows the
# distribution of m. Expected payoff of offer o is (100 - o) P(m <= o).
# The threshold distribution below is illustrative, NOT data; it
# stands for the qualitative pattern that low offers are often
# rejected (Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982; Guth and Kocher
# 2014). Exact fractions.
from fractions import Fraction as F

THRESH = ((0, F(10, 100)), (10, F(15, 100)), (20, F(20, 100)),
          (30, F(25, 100)), (40, F(20, 100)), (50, F(10, 100)))


def accept(o):
    p = F(0)
    for m, w in THRESH:
        if m <= o:
            p = p + w
    return p


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("offer  P(accept)  proposer EV  responder EV")
    best = None
    for o in range(0, 60, 10):
        p = accept(o)
        ev = (100 - o) * p
        print("{:5d} {:10.2f} {:12.2f} {:13.2f}".format(
            o, float(p), float(ev), float(o * p)))
        if best is None or ev > best[1]:
            best = (o, ev)
    print("best offer {} with EV {:.2f}".format(best[0], float(best[1])))
    print("subgame-perfect offer with no rejections: the minimum unit")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《纳什议价解与联名分润、外部选项威胁点与风险态度的分配母典》第 6 章「五五开为什么到处都是:最后通牒、聚点与讨价还价的成本」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论