What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side”?
Answer: Chapter 3 uses power utility to show that the more risk-averse side gives up share, and computes that on a two-point risky pool a guarantee raises the creator's certainty equivalent by 2.8433 and the brand's expectation by 0.8384.
Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.8384, 2.8433
mean pool 100.0; creator u = x^0.5 A pure share: s = 0.3682 creator mean 36.8171 CE 33.1354 brand mean 63.1829 risk premium borne by creator 3.6817 B guarantee: fee f = 35.9787 (CE = fee) brand mean 64.0213 gain from B over A: creator CE +2.8433, brand +0.8384 Nash products: A 86.0783 B 96.4826
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p32: a risky pool, pure revenue share versus a guarantee.
# Model: pool R is 160 or 40 with probability 1/2 each (mean 100).
# Creator: u(x) = x^0.5 (risk averse); brand: risk neutral. Outside
# options dC = 10, dB = 30 in money, received for certain.
# Contract A: creator gets share s of R. Contract B: creator gets a
# fixed fee f, the brand keeps R - f. Each contract's terms are set by
# the Nash product of expected-utility gains; golden-section search.
# CE = certainty equivalent. Parameters are illustrative.
import math
HI, LO, PR = 160.0, 40.0, 0.5
A, DC, DB = 0.5, 10.0, 30.0
MEAN = math.fsum([PR * HI, (1 - PR) * LO])
def eu_share(s):
return math.fsum([PR * (s * HI) ** A, (1 - PR) * (s * LO) ** A])
def np_share(s):
g1 = eu_share(s) - DC ** A
g2 = (1 - s) * MEAN - DB
return g1 * g2 if g1 > 0 and g2 > 0 else -1.0
def np_fee(f):
g1 = f ** A - DC ** A
g2 = MEAN - f - DB
return g1 * g2 if g1 > 0 and g2 > 0 else -1.0
def golden(fn, lo, hi, tol=1e-12):
r = (math.sqrt(5) - 1) / 2
while hi - lo > tol:
c, d = hi - r * (hi - lo), lo + r * (hi - lo)
if fn(c) > fn(d):
hi = d
else:
lo = c
return (lo + hi) / 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
s = golden(np_share, 0.0, 1.0)
ce = eu_share(s) ** (1 / A)
b_share = (1 - s) * MEAN
print("mean pool {:.1f}; creator u = x^{}".format(MEAN, A))
print("A pure share: s = {:.4f}".format(s))
print(" creator mean {:.4f} CE {:.4f}".format(s * MEAN, ce))
print(" brand mean {:.4f}".format(b_share))
print(" risk premium borne by creator {:.4f}".format(
s * MEAN - ce))
f = golden(np_fee, DC, MEAN - DB)
print("B guarantee: fee f = {:.4f} (CE = fee)".format(f))
print(" brand mean {:.4f}".format(MEAN - f))
print("gain from B over A: creator CE {:+.4f}, brand {:+.4f}".format(
f - ce, (MEAN - f) - b_share))
print("Nash products: A {:.4f} B {:.4f}".format(
np_share(s), np_fee(f)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product
- Chapter 2 · Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown
- Chapter 4 · The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power
- Chapter 5 · The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
- Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test