What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”?

Answer: Chapter 5 sets the 1975 solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky beside Nash's.

Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only

S  Nash (3/4, 3/4)  KS (3/4, 3/4)
T  Nash (1, 7/10)  KS (10/13, 10/13)
player 2 under Nash: S 0.7500 -> T 0.7000
player 2 under KS:   S 0.7500 -> T 0.7692
Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky on piecewise-linear sets.
# Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) example: S = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(3/4,3/4),
# (1,0)} and T = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(1,7/10),(1,0)}. T contains S and
# each player's best possible payoff is 1 in both, yet the Nash point
# gives player 2 less in T. KS picks the frontier point on the line
# from the disagreement point (0,0) to the ideal point. Exact
# fractions: on each frontier segment the Nash product is a quadratic,
# maximised at a vertex or at its stationary point.
from fractions import Fraction as F


def nash(front):
    best = None
    for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
        cands = [F(0), F(1)]
        # u = a + t (b - a); product quadratic in t
        p2 = (b1 - a1) * (b2 - a2)
        p1 = a1 * (b2 - a2) + a2 * (b1 - a1)
        if p2 < 0:
            t = -p1 / (2 * p2)
            if 0 < t < 1:
                cands.append(t)
        for t in cands:
            u = (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
            if best is None or u[0] * u[1] > best[0]:
                best = (u[0] * u[1], u)
    return best[1]


def ks(front):
    m1 = max(p[0] for p in front)
    m2 = max(p[1] for p in front)
    for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
        # solve a2 + t (b2 - a2) = (m2 / m1)(a1 + t (b1 - a1))
        k = m2 / m1
        den = (b2 - a2) - k * (b1 - a1)
        if den != 0:
            t = (k * a1 - a2) / den
            if 0 <= t <= 1:
                return (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
    return None


def show(name, front):
    n, k = nash(front), ks(front)
    print("{}  Nash ({}, {})  KS ({}, {})".format(
        name, n[0], n[1], k[0], k[1]))
    return n, k


if __name__ == "__main__":
    S = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(3, 4), F(3, 4)), (F(1), F(0))]
    T = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(1), F(7, 10)), (F(1), F(0))]
    ns, ks_ = show("S", S)
    nt, kt = show("T", T)
    print("player 2 under Nash: S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
        float(ns[1]), float(nt[1])))
    print("player 2 under KS:   S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
        float(ks_[1]), float(kt[1])))
    print("Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book