What does Nash Bargaining and Co-Branding Splits conclude, in numbers, about “The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”?
Answer: Chapter 5 sets the 1975 solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky beside Nash's.
Scope of the numbers: Under one set of illustrative parameters, with outside options of 10 for the creator and 30 for the brand, fifty-fifty keeps only 0.8889 of the maximum Nash product. Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs; the book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
S Nash (3/4, 3/4) KS (3/4, 3/4) T Nash (1, 7/10) KS (10/13, 10/13) player 2 under Nash: S 0.7500 -> T 0.7000 player 2 under KS: S 0.7500 -> T 0.7692 Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky on piecewise-linear sets.
# Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) example: S = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(3/4,3/4),
# (1,0)} and T = hull{(0,0),(0,1),(1,7/10),(1,0)}. T contains S and
# each player's best possible payoff is 1 in both, yet the Nash point
# gives player 2 less in T. KS picks the frontier point on the line
# from the disagreement point (0,0) to the ideal point. Exact
# fractions: on each frontier segment the Nash product is a quadratic,
# maximised at a vertex or at its stationary point.
from fractions import Fraction as F
def nash(front):
best = None
for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
cands = [F(0), F(1)]
# u = a + t (b - a); product quadratic in t
p2 = (b1 - a1) * (b2 - a2)
p1 = a1 * (b2 - a2) + a2 * (b1 - a1)
if p2 < 0:
t = -p1 / (2 * p2)
if 0 < t < 1:
cands.append(t)
for t in cands:
u = (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
if best is None or u[0] * u[1] > best[0]:
best = (u[0] * u[1], u)
return best[1]
def ks(front):
m1 = max(p[0] for p in front)
m2 = max(p[1] for p in front)
for (a1, a2), (b1, b2) in zip(front, front[1:]):
# solve a2 + t (b2 - a2) = (m2 / m1)(a1 + t (b1 - a1))
k = m2 / m1
den = (b2 - a2) - k * (b1 - a1)
if den != 0:
t = (k * a1 - a2) / den
if 0 <= t <= 1:
return (a1 + t * (b1 - a1), a2 + t * (b2 - a2))
return None
def show(name, front):
n, k = nash(front), ks(front)
print("{} Nash ({}, {}) KS ({}, {})".format(
name, n[0], n[1], k[0], k[1]))
return n, k
if __name__ == "__main__":
S = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(3, 4), F(3, 4)), (F(1), F(0))]
T = [(F(0), F(1)), (F(1), F(7, 10)), (F(1), F(0))]
ns, ks_ = show("S", S)
nt, kt = show("T", T)
print("player 2 under Nash: S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
float(ns[1]), float(nt[1])))
print("player 2 under KS: S {:.4f} -> T {:.4f}".format(
float(ks_[1]), float(kt[1])))
print("Nash violates monotonicity here; KS does not")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Comparison: Monotonicity against Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-320 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026320,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Nash Bargaining Solution and Co-Branding Revenue Splits: Threat Points from Outside Options and Allocation under Risk Attitudes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Fifty-Fifty Is Not the Fair Point: Nash's Four Axioms and the Nash Product
- Chapter 2 · Where the Threat Point Comes From: Outside Options, Payoffs during Disagreement and the Risk of Breakdown
- Chapter 3 · Attitudes to Risk: How the Curvature of Utility Hands Money to the Other Side
- Chapter 4 · The Asymmetric Nash Solution and Alternating Offers: Patience Is Bargaining Power
- Chapter 6 · Why Fifty-Fifty Is Everywhere: Ultimatums, Focal Points and the Cost of Haggling
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard" and Edgeworth's Contract Curve
- Chapter 8 · The Co-Branding Negotiation Table: an Empirical Loop, the Bargainer and a Pre-registered Test