What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names”?
Answer: Reputation's collateral is the future, so whatever weakens the future weakens reputation. Once an agent's chance of leaving reaches 0.05 per period, the rent at stake under illustrative parameters no longer outweighs a single theft; with a known end, large sums entrusted within 13 periods of departure need escrow; and when new names are free, every honest newcomer pays 8 periods of probation for the cheat's ability to disguise himself. The common rule of repair is this: where the future is not worth enough, give the agent something to lose now. With that, the modelling part of the book is complete. How did people in earlier centuries think about these problems? The next chapter returns to two sources, one from Ming-dynasty Huizhou and one from that storeroom in Cairo.
Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.05, 13
| A. unknown exit date, exit chance x per period | |
| x a rent at stake escrow needed for G | 5 |
| 0.00 | 0.8550 5.897 0.000 |
| 0.02 | 0.8379 5.169 0.000 |
| 0.05 | 0.8122 4.326 0.674 |
| 0.10 | 0.7695 3.338 1.662 |
| 0.20 | 0.6840 2.165 2.835 |
| B. known exit date, x | 0, k periods left |
| k rent at stake escrow needed for G | 5 |
| 0 | 0.000 5.000 |
| 1 | 0.855 4.145 |
| 2 | 1.586 3.414 |
| 3 | 2.211 2.789 |
| 5 | 3.202 1.798 |
| 10 | 4.666 0.334 |
| 20 | 5.640 0.000 |
| C. without escrow honesty needs at least k | 13 periods left |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p61: exits, last voyages and escrowed pay.
# Model: with a = d (1 - x)(1 - q), where x is the chance per period
# that the agent leaves the trade for good, the rent he forfeits by a
# theft is worth r a (1 - a^k) / (1 - a) when k periods of relation are
# left (k infinite gives r a / (1 - a)). Honesty needs G <= that value
# plus any escrow B he would forfeit. d = 0.90, q = 0.05, r = 1 and the
# theft gain G = 5 are illustrative.
# 模型:代理人退出概率与已知终局对守信的侵蚀,以及托管薪酬的补救。
D, Q, R, G = 0.90, 0.05, 1.0, 5.0
def a_of(x):
return D * (1.0 - x) * (1.0 - Q)
def rent_value(x, k=None):
a = a_of(x)
if k is None:
return R * a / (1.0 - a)
return R * a * (1.0 - a ** k) / (1.0 - a)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("A. unknown exit date, exit chance x per period")
print(" x a rent at stake escrow needed for G = 5")
for x in (0.0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20):
v = rent_value(x)
print(" {:.2f} {:.4f} {:7.3f} {:6.3f}".format(
x, a_of(x), v, max(0.0, G - v)))
print("B. known exit date, x = 0, k periods left")
print(" k rent at stake escrow needed for G = 5")
for k in (0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20):
v = rent_value(0.0, k)
print(" {:<3d} {:7.3f} {:6.3f}".format(
k, v, max(0.0, G - v)))
k = 0
while rent_value(0.0, k) < G:
k += 1
print("C. without escrow honesty needs at least k = {} periods left"
.format(k))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment
- Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
- Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
- Chapter 4 · The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police
- Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
- Chapter 7 · Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard