What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives eight clauses for sharing a blacklist, a pre-registered test and the distilled Agent Credit Scorecard; in simulation a verified shared list cuts the share of agents with a motive to default to 0.245, while an unverified one lets it climb back to 0.417. The scorecard uses transaction conduct only and must not be used to discriminate. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.245, 0.417
| protocol | s | e | default | wrongly listed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| none | 0.0 | 0.000 | 0.940 | 0 of 24 |
| verified | 0.9 | 0.005 | 0.245 | 34 of 302 |
| unverified | 0.9 | 0.050 | 0.417 | 177 of 233 |
| defaults counted among 400 agents; listing term 12 months |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p83: three blacklist protocols on one simulated market.
# Model: 400 agents, each with a private discount d_i ~ U(0.80, 0.98)
# and a typical order at stake G_i ~ U(0.5, 6) rent units (fixed seed).
# An agent defaults iff G_i exceeds his G_max under the protocol, using
# the p52 formulas: listing term T = 12, outsider rehire q0 = H (1 - s),
# false-report rate e. Protocols: none (s = 0, e = 0), verified sharing
# (s = 0.9, e = 0.005) and unverified sharing (s = 0.9, e = 0.05). We
# also count honest agents wrongly listed at least once in 24 months.
# 模型:无共享、核实后共享、未经核实共享三种协议的违约与误伤。
import random
R, W0, H, T = 1.0, 1.0, 0.5, 12
def g_max(d, s, e):
q0 = H * (1.0 - s)
a, b = 1.0, 0.0
for _ in range(T):
a, b = q0 + (1.0 - q0) * d * a, (1.0 - q0) * (W0 + d * b)
w = W0 + R
v = (w + d * e * b) / (1.0 - d * (1.0 - e) - d * e * a)
return v - w - d * (a * v + b)
def market(rng):
return [(rng.uniform(0.80, 0.98), rng.uniform(0.5, 6.0))
for _ in range(400)]
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(20261112)
agents = market(rng)
print(" protocol s e default wrongly listed")
for name, s, e in (("none", 0.0, 0.0), ("verified", 0.9, 0.005),
("unverified", 0.9, 0.05)):
bad = [g > g_max(d, s, e) for d, g in agents]
honest = [i for i, x in enumerate(bad) if not x]
hit = 0
for _ in honest:
if any(rng.random() < e for _ in range(24)):
hit += 1
print(" {:<12s} {:.1f} {:.3f} {:.3f} {:3d} of {}".format(
name, s, e, len([x for x in bad if x]) / 400.0, hit,
len(honest)))
print("defaults counted among 400 agents; listing term 12 months")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment
- Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
- Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
- Chapter 4 · The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police
- Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
- Chapter 6 · Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names
- Chapter 7 · Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters