What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment”?

Answer: Chapter 1 derives the discount threshold G/(G+r) under multilateral punishment, 0.8333 when theft is worth five periods of rent; if the cheat has a 0.15 chance per period of being rehired elsewhere it rises to 0.9804.

Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.15, 0.8333, 0.9804

d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works
G/r q0.00 q=0.05 q=0.10 q=0.15 q=0.25 q=0.50
10.5000 0.5263 0.5556 0.5882 0.6667 none
30.7500 0.7895 0.8333 0.8824 none none
50.8333 0.8772 0.9259 0.9804 none none
90.9000 0.9474 none none none none
largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives:
G/r1: q < 0.5000
G/r3: q < 0.2500
G/r5: q < 0.1667
G/r9: q < 0.1000

Key formula

\[d \ge d^* = \frac{G}{G + r}.\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: bilateral versus multilateral punishment.
# Model: after a theft the cheated merchant never hires the agent again,
# but each later period another merchant, who has not heard, rehires
# him with probability q (q = 0 is the full multilateral boycott). With
# the value recursion of the text, honesty needs
#     d >= d*(q) = G / ((1 - q) * (G + r)),
# and no discount factor below one works once q >= r / (G + r).
# G is the one-shot gain, r the per-period rent. Values illustrative.
# 模型:双边惩罚下被骗者之外的商人以概率 q 再雇用骗子。


def d_star(g, r, q):
    return g / ((1.0 - q) * (g + r))


def q_limit(g, r):
    return r / (g + r)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    qs = (0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.25, 0.50)
    print("d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works")
    print("  G/r  " + "".join("  q={:.2f}".format(q) for q in qs))
    for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
        cells = []
        for q in qs:
            d = d_star(ratio, 1.0, q)
            cells.append("  {:6.4f}".format(d) if d < 1.0 else
                         "    none")
        print("  {:3.0f}  ".format(ratio) + "".join(cells))
    print("largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives:")
    for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
        print("  G/r = {:.0f}: q < {:.4f}".format(ratio,
                                             q_limit(ratio, 1.0)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book