What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment”?
Answer: Chapter 1 derives the discount threshold G/(G+r) under multilateral punishment, 0.8333 when theft is worth five periods of rent; if the cheat has a 0.15 chance per period of being rehired elsewhere it rises to 0.9804.
Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.15, 0.8333, 0.9804
| d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works | |
| G/r q | 0.00 q=0.05 q=0.10 q=0.15 q=0.25 q=0.50 |
| 1 | 0.5000 0.5263 0.5556 0.5882 0.6667 none |
| 3 | 0.7500 0.7895 0.8333 0.8824 none none |
| 5 | 0.8333 0.8772 0.9259 0.9804 none none |
| 9 | 0.9000 0.9474 none none none none |
| largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives: | |
| G/r | 1: q < 0.5000 |
| G/r | 3: q < 0.2500 |
| G/r | 5: q < 0.1667 |
| G/r | 9: q < 0.1000 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: bilateral versus multilateral punishment.
# Model: after a theft the cheated merchant never hires the agent again,
# but each later period another merchant, who has not heard, rehires
# him with probability q (q = 0 is the full multilateral boycott). With
# the value recursion of the text, honesty needs
# d >= d*(q) = G / ((1 - q) * (G + r)),
# and no discount factor below one works once q >= r / (G + r).
# G is the one-shot gain, r the per-period rent. Values illustrative.
# 模型:双边惩罚下被骗者之外的商人以概率 q 再雇用骗子。
def d_star(g, r, q):
return g / ((1.0 - q) * (g + r))
def q_limit(g, r):
return r / (g + r)
if __name__ == "__main__":
qs = (0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.25, 0.50)
print("d*(q) = G / ((1 - q)(G + r)); 'none' means no d < 1 works")
print(" G/r " + "".join(" q={:.2f}".format(q) for q in qs))
for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
cells = []
for q in qs:
d = d_star(ratio, 1.0, q)
cells.append(" {:6.4f}".format(d) if d < 1.0 else
" none")
print(" {:3.0f} ".format(ratio) + "".join(cells))
print("largest rehire probability that any d < 1 survives:")
for ratio in (1.0, 3.0, 5.0, 9.0):
print(" G/r = {:.0f}: q < {:.4f}".format(ratio,
q_limit(ratio, 1.0)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
- Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
- Chapter 4 · The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police
- Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
- Chapter 6 · Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names
- Chapter 7 · Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard