What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police”?
Answer: Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 33742
| multilateral benchmark d* = G/(G+r) = 0.8333 | |||
| N | chain k=1 | chain k=2 | mixed k=1 |
| 10 | 0.8333 | 0.8333 | 0.8333 |
| 20 | 0.8333 | 0.8333 | 0.8333 |
| 50 | 0.8706 | 0.8347 | 0.8334 |
| 100 | 0.9226 | 0.8718 | 0.8336 |
| 200 | 0.9737 | 0.9234 | 0.8342 |
| 1000 | 1.0000 | 0.9994 | 0.8416 |
| 10000 | none | none | 0.8841 |
| critical N (first size at which honesty fails) | |||
| d = 0.90: chain k=1 76, chain k=2 149, mixed k=1 33742 | |||
| d = 0.95: chain k=1 142, chain k=2 282, mixed k=1 > 10^7 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the critical coalition size at which reputation fails.
# Model: a theft at period 0 is known only to the victim. News spreads
# as SI: on a chain of correspondents (k members further in each
# direction per period) or in a mixed coalition (each informed member
# writes k letters a round); M letter rounds fit in one hiring period.
# From period 1 the cheater finds an opening with probability H and is
# rehired if that member has not heard, so q_t = H (1 - i_t). Honest
# value V = w / (1 - d); boycotted cheater
# U_t = q_t V + (1 - q_t)(w0 + d U_{t+1}); honesty iff V >= w + G + d U_1.
# d*(N) by bisection. G = 5, r = 1, w0 = 1, H = 0.5, M = 12 illustrative.
# 模型:SI 扩散决定再雇用概率,求声誉失效的临界群规模。
import math
G, R, W0, H = 5.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.5
def informed_path(n, k, kind, m=12):
path, i, t = [], 1.0 / n, 0
while i < 1.0 - 1e-12 and t < 100000:
for _ in range(m):
t += 1
if kind == "chain":
i = min(1.0, (1.0 + 2.0 * k * t) / n)
else:
i = 1.0 - (1.0 - i) * (1.0 - 1.0 / (n - 1)) ** (k * i * n)
path.append(i)
return path
def honest_margin(d, path):
w = W0 + R
v = w / (1.0 - d)
u = W0 / (1.0 - d)
for i in reversed(path):
q = H * (1.0 - i)
u = q * v + (1.0 - q) * (W0 + d * u)
return v - math.fsum([w, G, d * u])
def d_star(path):
lo, hi = 0.0, 0.999999
if honest_margin(hi, path) < 0.0:
return None
for _ in range(50):
mid = 0.5 * (lo + hi)
if honest_margin(mid, path) >= 0.0:
hi = mid
else:
lo = mid
return hi
def fails(n, k, kind, d):
ds = d_star(informed_path(n, k, kind))
return ds is None or ds > d
def critical_n(k, kind, d):
lo, hi = 3, 6
while not fails(hi, k, kind, d):
lo, hi = hi, hi * 2
if hi > 10 ** 7:
return "> 10^7"
while hi - lo > 1:
mid = (lo + hi) // 2
if fails(mid, k, kind, d):
hi = mid
else:
lo = mid
return str(hi)
def fmt(x):
return " none " if x is None else "{:.4f}".format(x)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("multilateral benchmark d* = G/(G+r) = {:.4f}".format(G / (G + R)))
print(" N chain k=1 chain k=2 mixed k=1")
for n in (10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 1000, 10000):
row = [d_star(informed_path(n, k, kind))
for k, kind in ((1, "chain"), (2, "chain"), (1, "mix"))]
print(" {:<6d} {} {} {}".format(n, *map(fmt, row)))
print("critical N (first size at which honesty fails)")
for d in (0.90, 0.95):
out = [critical_n(k, kind, d)
for k, kind in ((1, "chain"), (2, "chain"), (1, "mix"))]
print(" d = {:.2f}: chain k=1 {}, chain k=2 {}, mixed k=1 {}"
.format(d, *out))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment
- Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
- Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
- Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
- Chapter 6 · Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names
- Chapter 7 · Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard