What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters”?
Answer: The Ming merchant manuals represented by the Shishang leiyao and the letters of the Maghribi traders in the Cairo Geniza answer the same question from two directions. The manuals' precepts tell a merchant how to protect himself where news does not flow, and p71 shows that native-place networks, social sanctions and guarantees, layered on one another, can multiply the order value that can be entrusted more than twentyfold. The Geniza letters show a group of merchants exchanging reputational information by correspondence, and p72 shows that this information was bound to the seasons of shipping, with winter delays long enough to loosen the hold of reputation for months. Neither source tells us where the limits of these mechanisms lie; that is a question today's data can answer. The last chapter turns the book's models into a protocol a buyer alliance can follow: how to build the list, how to take deposits, how to compute the scorecard, and what results would overturn this book?
Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it.
| setting | G_max | x stranger | d* (G = 5) |
| stranger broker | 0.818 | 1.00 | none |
| native-place news | 5.897 | 7.21 | 0.8772 |
| + standing at home | 8.845 | 10.81 | 0.8097 |
| + guarantor g=0.5 | 17.690 | 21.62 | 0.6579 |
| each layer multiplies the order a merchant can entrust |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p71: native-place networks, guarantors and the stranger.
# Model: G_max = a r / ((1 - a)(1 - g)), with a = d (1 - q),
# q = H (1 - s), r = w - w0 and g the share of a theft that a guarantor
# recovers from the agent or his kin. Four settings: a broker who is a
# stranger (no one else hears, s = 0); a native-place network in which
# news reaches s = 0.9 of members within the period; the same network
# where exclusion also costs the agent standing at home (w0 falls from
# 1 to 0.5); and the same with a guarantor recovering g = 0.5.
# d = 0.90, H = 0.5, w = 2 are illustrative, not drawn from sources.
# 模型:陌生牙人、同乡网络、同乡加社会惩罚、再加保人四种情形。
D, H, W = 0.90, 0.5, 2.0
def g_max(s, w0, g):
a = D * (1.0 - H * (1.0 - s))
return a * (W - w0) / ((1.0 - a) * (1.0 - g))
def d_star(gain, s, w0, g):
# smallest d with gain (1 - g) <= d (1 - q)(gain (1 - g) + r)
q = H * (1.0 - s)
eff = gain * (1.0 - g)
return eff / ((1.0 - q) * (eff + W - w0))
if __name__ == "__main__":
cases = (("stranger broker", 0.0, 1.0, 0.0),
("native-place news", 0.9, 1.0, 0.0),
("+ standing at home", 0.9, 0.5, 0.0),
("+ guarantor g=0.5", 0.9, 0.5, 0.5))
base = g_max(0.0, 1.0, 0.0)
print(" setting G_max x stranger d* (G = 5)")
for name, s, w0, g in cases:
gm = g_max(s, w0, g)
ds = d_star(5.0, s, w0, g)
dtxt = "{:.4f}".format(ds) if ds < 1.0 else "none"
print(" {:<20s} {:6.3f} {:6.2f} {}".format(
name, gm, gm / base, dtxt))
print("each layer multiplies the order a merchant can entrust")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Sources East and West: the Shishang leiyao and the Cairo Geniza Letters. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · One-Shot Theft against Future Rent: the Discount Threshold of Multilateral Punishment
- Chapter 2 · The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts
- Chapter 3 · How Bad News Travels: SI Diffusion, Rings of Correspondents and Rumours that Stop
- Chapter 4 · The Critical Group Size: How Large a Network Can Reputation Police
- Chapter 5 · Blacklists in Buyer Alliances: Coverage, False Reports and Deposits
- Chapter 6 · Where Reputation Ends: Last Periods, Exits and New Names
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Blacklist-Sharing Protocol, Deposits and the Agent Credit Scorecard