What does Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks conclude, in numbers, about “The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts”?

Answer: Chapter 2 sets Greif against Edwards and Ogilvie and finds courts and multilateral punishment to be complements: a court that wins with probability 0.4 and no blacklist gives a threshold of 0.8497, close to that of a blacklist alone.

Scope of the numbers: Its agents, orders and network parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal or financial advice. Chapter 4 finds the critical group size: tens to over a hundred members in chain-like networks of acquaintances under illustrative parameters, but 33742 in a well-mixed network.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.4, 0.8497

G/r5, fine f = 0.2; d* and r_min (at d = 0.90)
court c d* multi d* bilat r_min multi r_min bilat
0.00.8333 0.9804 0.556 1.536
0.20.7917 0.9314 0.422 1.167
0.40.7222 0.8497 0.289 0.799
0.60.5833 0.6863 0.156 0.430
drop in d* when a court with c0.4 is added:
multilateral 0.1111, bilateral 0.1307
d* with c0.4 but no boycott at all (q = 0.15) vs
boycott with no court0.8497 vs 0.8333
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: courts and coalitions, substitutes or complements.
# Model: a court wins back the stolen gain plus a fine f with probability
# c, so the expected gain shrinks to Gc = G (1 - c (1 + f)). Reputation
# then needs d >= Gc / ((1 - q)(Gc + r)). q = 0 is the multilateral
# boycott Greif describes, q = 0.15 a bilateral regime in which other
# merchants often have not heard. G/r = 5, f = 0.2 and d = 0.90 are
# illustrative; c falls with the distance to a usable court.
# 模型:法院以概率 c 追回赃款并罚款,与多边惩罚叠加时的守信门槛。


def gain_after_court(g, c, f):
    return max(0.0, g * (1.0 - c * (1.0 + f)))


def d_star(g, r, q):
    if g == 0.0:
        return 0.0
    return g / ((1.0 - q) * (g + r))


def r_min(g, d, q):
    a = d * (1.0 - q)
    return g * (1.0 - a) / a


if __name__ == "__main__":
    g, r, f, d = 5.0, 1.0, 0.2, 0.90
    print("G/r = 5, fine f = 0.2; d* and r_min (at d = 0.90)")
    print("  court c   d* multi  d* bilat   r_min multi  r_min bilat")
    rows = {}
    for c in (0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6):
        gc = gain_after_court(g, c, f)
        dm, db = d_star(gc, r, 0.0), d_star(gc, r, 0.15)
        rows[c] = (dm, db)
        bil = "{:.4f}".format(db) if db < 1.0 else "  none"
        print("  {:.1f}       {:.4f}    {}     {:6.3f}       {:6.3f}"
              .format(c, dm, bil, r_min(gc, d, 0.0),
                      r_min(gc, d, 0.15)))
    print("drop in d* when a court with c = 0.4 is added:")
    print("  multilateral {:.4f}, bilateral {:.4f}".format(
        rows[0.0][0] - rows[0.4][0], rows[0.0][1] - rows[0.4][1]))
    print("d* with c = 0.4 but no boycott at all (q = 0.15) vs")
    print("boycott with no court: {:.4f} vs {:.4f}".format(
        rows[0.4][1], rows[0.0][0]))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: The Maghribi Dispute: Greif's Coalition and Edwards and Ogilvie's Courts. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-222 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026222,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multilateral Punishment in Merchant Networks: Maghribi Agency Games and Trust Networks in Buyer Communities},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book